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CAN BANKS BE LIABLE
FOR AIDING AND ABETTING TERRORISM?:
A CLOSER LOOK INTO THE SPLIT
ON SECONDARY LIABILITY
UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM ACT
Alison Bitterly*
The Antiterrorism Act of 1990 (ATA) explicitly authorizes a private cause
of action for U.S. nationals who suffer an injury “by reason of an act of
international terrorism.” ATA civil litigation has increased dramatically
following September 11, 2001—and banks, because of their deep pockets,
have emerged as an increasingly popular target. Courts are divided
concerning the scope of liability under the statute, specifically over whether
the ATA authorizes a cause of action premised on secondary liability.
Under a secondary liability theory, a plaintiff could argue that a bank,
through providing financial services to a terrorist client, aided and abetted
an act of international terrorism.
This Note examines the conflict over secondary liability under the ATA,
applies this conflict to banks specifically, and concludes that the legislative
history of the ATA civil provision is not enough to support such a cause of
action. This Note ultimately finds, however, that the absence of any kind of
secondary liability route for plaintiffs diminishes the ATA‟s power as a
deterrent against terrorism financing and also has interesting
repercussions for primary liability cases. As a result, this Note argues that
Congress should amend the ATA to explicitly permit secondary liability.
However, in order to guard against excessive suits against innocent banks,
courts should only permit claims premised upon secondary liability in
extreme cases where the bank manifested intent or extreme recklessness in
their dealings with terrorist clients.
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INTRODUCTION
Bank A handles millions of accounts worldwide. It provides routine
financial services to clients across six continents. As a result of a bank
employee‘s negligence, the bank transfers funds through a computerized
system to a U.S.-designated terrorist group in the Middle East. This money
is used to procure a suicide vest, which a member of the group puts on and
detonates in a street in Iraq. One of the innocent bystanders killed is an
American.
Bank B does not possess the same level of business as Bank A. Instead, it
knowingly provides both routine and nonroutine services to a terrorist
organization. For instance, Bank B delivers personalized payments to the
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families of suicide bombers after their deaths. The terrorist group linked to
the bank launches an attack abroad that kills an American.
Bank C conducts business with many countries—including Iran, a
country on the U.S. State Sponsors of Terrorism list (―SST list‖).1 The
extensive business with Iran is in violation of U.S. Office of Foreign Asset
Control (OFAC) sanctions.2 Some of the funds the bank transfers to Iran
are traced to the terrorist group Hezbollah. The group launches an attack in
Israel that kills an American citizen.3
The civil provision of the Antiterrorism Act4 (ATA) expressly provides
U.S. nationals with a private right of action for injury to person, property, or
business, ―by reason of an act of international terrorism.‖ 5 In enacting the
ATA, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a), the government has enlisted private
plaintiffs in the fight against terrorism, and § 2333(a) has become yet
another weapon in the United States‘ counterterrorism arsenal.6
Although it is clear that the ATA permits plaintiffs to name as defendants
the terrorist organizations or persons directly responsible for committing an
act fitting within the definition of international terrorism,7 U.S. federal
courts are split over whether the ATA provides for suits under a secondary
liability theory.8 As secondary liability often presents a different set of
1. See infra Part I.C.2.
2. See infra Part I.B.2 for further discussion on OFAC and its regulation of U.S.
financial transactions involving foreign nations.
3. These hypothetical scenarios bear some resemblance to the three categories of
Antiterrorist Act (ATA) banking cases addressed in 2 VED P. NANDA & DAVID K. PANSIUS,
LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS § 9:42 (1986).
4. See Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, Title X,
§ 1003(a)(4), 106 Stat. 4522 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331–2338 (1992));
Antiterrorism Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-519; 104 Stat. 2250 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2331–2338 (1990)). The 1990 Act was removed for technical reasons and
reinstated in 1992 with the same language. See infra note 50.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2012). This Note will refer to 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) as the ATA
civil provision, as the ATA private cause of action, or simply as § 2333(a). The entirety of
the ATA is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331–2338, which contains the civil and criminal
provisions that this Note will collectively refer to as the ATA. Title 18 U.S.C. § 2339A–D
contains the material support provisions, which were added in later years, and are discussed
as part of the ATA in this Note. See infra Part I.A.3. This Note will collectively refer to the
material support amendments as the ―material support law.‖
6. See Brief of Petitioners-Appellants at 1, In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001,
714 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2013) (No. 13-318) (―Both Congress and other federal courts have
confirmed that the provision of the ATA at issue is essential to deterring and punishing the
financing and material sponsorship of terrorism.‖); see also Debra Strauss, Enlisting the U.S.
Courts in a New Front: Dismantling the International Business Holdings of Terrorist
Groups Through Federal Statutory and Common-Law Suits, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT‘L L.
679, 739 (2005) (―The testimony supporting [the ATA] legislation placed much emphasis on
the deterrent effect that these statutes would have on the commission of acts of international
terrorism against U.S. citizens.‖).
7. See infra Part I.A.1 for greater consideration of this definition, which is codified at
18 U.S.C. § 2331(1).
8. See Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 54 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting
that at the time of the 2010 Wultz ruling ―circuits [were] split on the issue‖ of ATA
secondary liability). With regard to banks, this Note will typically refer to aiding and
abetting liability (a form of secondary liability) and the more general concept of secondary
liability interchangeably.
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requirements than primary liability, the availability of secondary liability is
of great importance to terrorism victim plaintiffs.9 In many cases, an aiding
and abetting suit against a bank, based upon allegations that the bank
provided financial services to a client terrorist group, may be a victim‘s best
chance for relief where suing under a primary liability theory is not
possible.10 In addition, as this Note discusses, the outcome of the
secondary liability debate also could have powerful ramifications for the
application of primary liability in banking cases.
Under the varying standards applied across circuits today, ATA litigation
against the above hypothetical banks could engender inconsistent results.11
In understanding these disparate outcomes in ATA banking cases, it is
helpful to consider banks as entities possessing ―mental states‖ across a
spectrum—ranging from negligence, to knowledge, to recklessness, to
intent—despite the fact that these are institutions rather than individuals.
Courts are in conflict over what the requisite mental state should be for both
secondary liability and primary liability.12
In the case of Bank A—where the bank is merely negligent—it is likely
(and arguably proper) that the bank will avoid liability; primary liability is
not a viable option for plaintiffs, and success under a secondary liability
theory is uncertain at best.13 Courts are much more likely to find Bank B
liable under primary liability because, regardless of the requisite mental
state for liability, Bank B arguably demonstrated intent to aid the terrorist
group. It is Bank C that illustrates the most ambiguous case. In doing
business with a state sponsor of terrorism, was the bank demonstrating
intent to aid terrorists? At what point should a bank know that its services
are aiding a terrorist organization? This Note considers these questions and
examines where the scope of ATA liability for banks stands today.
Although the ATA private cause of action has been in place for over
twenty years, plaintiffs did not begin to take full advantage of its potential
until its second decade of life.14 The September 11, 2001, attacks on the
United States precipitated both a spike in terrorism-related lawsuits and the

9. See infra Part I.B.
10. Primary liability was the basis of a recent successful lawsuit and trial centered upon
Arab Bank, PLC. See Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 04-cv-2799, 2014 WL 4913320
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2014) (verdict form); Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 04-cv-2799 (BMC)
(VVP), 2015 WL 1565479, at *27 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2015) (upholding the jury‘s verdict and
discussing the nature of ATA liability). In September 2014, a jury in Linde v. Arab Bank
found Arab Bank liable for violating § 2333(a). Linde, 2014 WL 4913320. The plaintiffs
had advanced the theory that the bank was primarily liable for material support to terrorism
and that violating this crime supported liability under the ATA civil provision. See Linde v.
Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 578–79 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). See infra Parts II and III
for further discussion of the use of the material support law as a substitute for aiding and
abetting liability.
11. See generally 2 NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 3.
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See Geoffrey Sant, So Banks Are Terrorists Now?: The Misuse of the Civil Suit
Provision of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 533, 534 (2013).
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U.S. government‘s increased efforts to stanch the flow of funding to
terrorism groups abroad.15
The phrase ―terrorism financing‖ typically refers to the act of knowingly
providing some resource to an individual or organization that takes part in
terrorist activity.16 The U.S. government has estimated that plotting and
executing the September 11 attacks required only between $400,000 and
$500,000.17 Actual terrorist operations constituted a comparatively small
portion of al Qaeda‘s budget at the time.18 The organization required
funding for training, salaries for jihadists, and arms and vehicles before
attacks could even be carried out.19 It is often difficult for governments to
differentiate between funds used for attacks and funds used to support a
terrorist group‘s social or political purposes.20 Furthermore, terrorist
funding often comes from legitimate sources—such as charities and
donors—as opposed to criminal activities.21
An extensive and long-established fundraising network fueled al Qaeda‘s
spread.22 Although al Qaeda as an organization likely did not use formal
financial practices to transfer or store money after 1996, al Qaeda
fundraisers continued to work within the means of traditional financial
systems.23 It is likely that some of the banks linked to al Qaeda supporters
were aware of their ties with terrorist organization fundraisers.24 The lack
of financial regulation in Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in
particular contributed to al Qaeda‘s pre–September 11 financing success,
and al Qaeda cells worldwide took advantage of susceptibilities within
formal banking systems.25
The United States began to take terrorism funding more seriously
following the 1998 bombings on the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and
Tanzania.26
President Bill Clinton‘s National Security Council
recommended that the United States issue sanctions against al Qaeda and
Osama bin Laden under the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act27 (IEEPA), which authorized the President to levy sanctions against
countries or entities that posed a national security threat to the United
States. Under the IEEPA, OFAC froze al Qaeda assets within the U.S.
15. See infra Part I.C.2.
16. See Terrorist Financing, U.S. ATTORNEY‘S BULL., July 2013, at 7.
17. See NAT‘L COMM‘N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT 169 (1st ed. 2004).
18. See id. at 171.
19. See id.
20. See Terrorist Financing, supra note 16, at 7.
21. Id.
22. See NAT‘L COMM‘N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., supra note 17, at 169–
70; see also JOHN ROTH ET AL., MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING 18 (2004).
23. See ROTH ET AL., supra note 22, at 25–26.
24. See id. at 26.
25. Id. (―[T]he September 11 hijackers and their co-conspirators had bank accounts and
credit cards, made extensive use of ATM cards, and sent and received international wire and
bank-to-bank transfers.‖).
26. See NAT‘L COMM‘N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., supra note 17, at 185.
27. Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1626 (1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1705
(1977)).
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financial system.28 After the United States formally designated al Qaeda a
terrorist organization in October 1999, banks were legally required to seize
the group‘s funds and block its transactions.29
This Note explores private suits against banks for their alleged
involvement in terrorist attacks overseas, with a particular focus on
secondary liability. Part I presents background on the ATA‘s language and
legislative history, as well as a discussion of secondary liability in general
and the ways in which courts have applied this form of liability in other
areas of the law. Part I also discusses the distinction between routine and
nonroutine bank services and addresses several other aspects of banking
regulation. Part II delves into the conflict over whether secondary liability
applies under the ATA‘s private cause of action and briefly addresses this
issue‘s relevance to primary liability. Part III argues that the absence of
secondary liability under the ATA produces some intolerable consequences.
As a result, Part III argues that Congress should amend the ATA to permit a
secondary liability private cause of action in extreme cases where a bank
manifests recklessness or intent—for example, by conducting extensive
business with a U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism.
I. THE ANTITERRORISM ACT, SECONDARY LIABILITY, AND THE
EMERGENCE OF TERRORISM SUITS AGAINST BANKS
Part I.A focuses on the ATA itself, including the material support for
terrorism crime that courts have sometimes incorporated into § 2333(a) via
a theory of primary liability.30
Part I.B clarifies the important
characteristics of these types of liability, as well as highlights how courts
have handled similar secondary liability issues in private securities fraud
suits and civil suits brought under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO). Finally, Part I.C provides some background
related to ATA banking cases in particular, focusing on the difference
between routine and nonroutine banking services and the United States‘
implementation of lists to monitor terrorist individuals, groups, and
sovereign states.
A. The Antiterrorism Act
This section summarizes the ATA civil provision‘s language and
legislative history. This discussion is at the heart of the secondary liability
issue and provides a necessary context for understanding how courts have
responded to increased ATA litigation targeting banks. This section also
addresses the ATA‘s material support law, which plaintiffs have sometimes
used as the basis for primary liability in banking cases.

28. See NAT‘L COMM‘N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., supra note 17, at 185.
29. See id. at 185 n.81 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2339B). See infra Part I.C for an explanation
of how OFAC utilizes lists to identify terrorist threats.
30. This Note, although focused on secondary liability, seeks to demonstrate that
secondary and primary liability are closely intertwined in ATA banking cases.
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1. The ATA‘s Statutory Language
The ATA explicitly establishes a civil remedy for victims of international
terrorism.31 Section 2333(a) states:
Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or
business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate,
survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any appropriate district court of
the United States and shall recover threefold the damages he or she
sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney‘s fees. 32

The statute expressly empowers U.S. nationals to file a claim.33
However, the phrasing of ―by reason of an act of international terrorism‖ is
somewhat ambiguous.34 For instance, some courts have held that this
language requires the fulfillment of a proximate cause element.35
Other areas of the ATA help illuminate the civil provision‘s language.
Section 2331(1) defines ―international terrorism‖ as activities that:
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or
that would be a criminal violation if committed within the
jurisdiction of the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended—
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by
which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to

31. See 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2012).
32. Id. See infra note 66 for a discussion of the phrase ―threefold the damages,‖ or
treble damages.
33. Id. Non-U.S. nationals have sought to use the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) as a means
for civil redress for terrorism crimes, although following the Supreme Court‘s holding in
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., foreign plaintiffs must now demonstrate that their
claims ―touch and concern‖ the United States to a degree that ―displace[s] the presumption
against extraterritorial application‖ in order to sue under the ATS. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659,
1669 (2013).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a).
35. See Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 95 (2d Cir. 2013) (relying on the reasoning
of RICO cases to hold that the ―by reason of‖ language in § 2333(a) indicates a proximate
cause requirement in primary liability claims); see also Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp.,
503 U.S. 258, 265–68 (1992) (finding that the ―by reason of‖ language in RICO‘s civil
provision suggested that both ―but for‖ causation and proximate causation were required
elements); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 560,
569 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (―‗By reason of‘ has been interpreted by courts to require something
more than ‗but for‘ causation.‖); infra Part I.B.2.a–b (discussing RICO and the Rothstein
ruling, respectively).
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intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate
or seek asylum . . . .36

This provision defines international terrorism in terms of ―acts‖ that
―involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life‖ that are in violation
of U.S. criminal law, or would be if committed within U.S. jurisdiction.37
Individuals must also commit these acts with the intent to coerce or
intimidate civilians or a government, or affect government conduct.38
Finally, the act must occur primarily outside of the United States or
―transcend national boundaries.‖39
In addition, the ATA civil provision does not identify whom a private
individual may sue—the language is open-ended.40 The definition of
terrorism in § 2331(1) also does not describe the terrorism actor, instead it
focuses on the nature of the acts.41 As a result, victims of terrorist attacks
abroad have attempted to use this provision to hold banks, corporations, and
countries liable for terrorist acts.42 Such cases have succeeded on some
occasions, particularly when the defendant was a state sponsor of
terrorism.43 Section 2333(a)‘s ambiguous language has consequently
opened the door for plaintiffs to sue also under the theory that banks are
secondarily liable for acts of international terrorism.44
2. The ATA‘s Legislative History
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to ―define and punish
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the

36. 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1). This definition is the same as the definition for international
terrorism provided in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511,
92 Stat. 1783 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801); see also Nick Harper, FISA‟s Fuzzy Line
Between Domestic and International Terrorism, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1123, 1138 (2014) (―The
ATA essentially adopted FISA‘s definition of international terrorism.‖); Nicholas J. Perry,
The Numerous Federal Legal Definitions of Terrorism: The Problem of Too Many Grails,
30 J. LEGIS. 249, 256 (2004) (―The definition of ‗international terrorism‘ . . . is a verbatim
copy of the FISA definition . . . .‖).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A).
38. Id. § 2331(1)(B).
39. Id. § 2331(1)(C). For instance, the Southern District of New York has held that the
September 11 attacks, while occurring on U.S. soil, nonetheless qualify as acts of
international terrorism because the attacks transcended national boundaries in their
magnitude and impact. See Nina J. Crimm, High Alert: The Government‟s War on the
Financing of Terrorism and Its Implications for Donors, Domestic Charitable
Organizations, and Global Philanthropy, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1341, 1435–36 (2004)
(citing Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 262 F. Supp. 2d 217, 221–22 (S.D.N.Y.
2003)).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a).
41. See id. § 2331(1).
42. See infra Part II.
43. See Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 864 F. Supp. 2d 24, 32–37 (D.D.C. 2012)
(holding Syria and Iran liable under the ATA).
44. See infra Part II.B.
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Law of Nations.‖45 This clause, known sometimes as the Define and
Punish Clause, has served as a basis for antiterrorism legislation.46
The ATA was first enacted in 1987.47 At that point, the legislation was
predominantly focused on the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).48
The act designated the PLO as a terrorist organization and instituted certain
restrictions on transactions and dealings with the group.49 In 1990,
Congress enacted a second version of the ATA that created several new
provisions, including the ATA‘s civil provision and the detailed definition
of international terrorism that remains part of the ATA today.50 Congress
continued to pass further antiterrorism legislation over the years,
particularly following the September 11 attacks.51
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic52 was the first case in which a court
considered civil liability for terrorist acts and likely helped spark the
movement toward a private cause of action for victims of international
terrorism.53 In this case, the plaintiffs sued the Libyan government, the
PLO, and PLO-linked nongovernmental organizations under the Alien Tort
Statute (ATS).54 The ATS had recently emerged as a tool for providing
redress to victims of crimes in violation of international norms.55 However,
on appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the lower court‘s dismissal of the case,

45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
46. See Patrick L. Donnelly, Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction over Acts of Terrorism
Committed Abroad: Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 599, 608–09 (1987) (describing the congressional powers authorized under
the Define and Punish Clause).
47. Antiterrorism Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-204, §§ 1001–1005, 101 Stat. 1406
(codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 5201–5203 (1987)); see also Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F.
Supp. 2d 257, 266 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (discussing the evolution of the ATA‘s civil provision).
48. 22 U.S.C. § 5202.
49. For instance, it is unlawful to receive ―anything of value‖ (excluding informational
material) from the PLO, expend funds from the PLO, or establish facilities on behalf of the
PLO. Id.
50. See supra note 35. In 1991, Congress repealed the ATA due to a technical issue. See
Goldberg v. UBS AG, 660 F. Supp. 2d 410, 414 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). However, in 1992,
Congress reenacted all of the 1990 Act‘s substantive provisions in the Federal Courts
Administration Act of 1992. See id.; Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 266
(E.D.N.Y. 2007).
51. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 (2001); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). See infra Part I.A.3 for a discussion of the material support
law, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339–2339(d).
52. 517 F. Supp. 542, 549–51 (D.D.C. 1981), aff‟d, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per
curiam). The case arose from a Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) attack in 1978 in
Haifa, Israel. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 776. The PLO took 121 civilian hostages, and before the
Israeli police were able to resolve the crisis, twelve children and twenty-two adults had been
killed, with eighty-seven injured. Id.
53. See Beth Van Schaack, Finding the Tort of Terrorism in International Law, 28 REV.
LITIG. 381, 285, 388 (2008).
54. Id. at 385–86.
55. Id. at 385. The ATS provides that ―district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.‖ 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
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holding that under the ATS there was no private cause of action for victims
of international terrorism.56
Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro57 also sheds light on the genesis of
the ATA‘s private cause of action. In 1985, members of the PLO
commandeered the Achille Lauro, an Italian cruise ship, on its journey
through the eastern Mediterranean Sea.58 The perpetrators murdered Leon
Klinghoffer, a U.S. citizen, during the attack.59 The Klinghoffer family was
able to bring its claims against the PLO in U.S. federal court only because
the crime took place in international waters and therefore was subject to
federal admiralty jurisdiction.60 If the terrorist act had occurred on land, it
is unlikely that any court would have upheld jurisdiction in the wake of TelOren.61 Congressional records from 1991 indicate that Klinghoffer was
instrumental in spurring Congress‘s enactment of a private cause of action
for terrorism cases.62 In enacting the ATA, Congress sought to provide a
more reliable form of relief for U.S. victims of international terrorism.63
Courts have also scrutinized the legislative history of the ATA in order to
better understand § 2333(a)‘s language.64 In a 1991 statement before the
Senate, Senator Charles Grassley, one of the ATA‘s sponsors, noted that the
statute enabled plaintiffs to circumvent ―jurisdictional hurdles‖ and
―empower[ed] victims with all the weapons available in civil litigation.‖65
He also stated that the ATA ―accords victims of terrorism the remedies of
56. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 798; see also Thomas H. Lee, The Three Lives of the Alien
Tort Statute: The Evolving Role of the Judiciary in U.S. Foreign Relations, 89 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1645, 1647 (2014); Van Schaack, supra note 53, at 386.
57. 739 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), vacated by 937 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991).
58. Id. at 856.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 858–59.
61. See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. (Boim I), 291 F.3d 1000, 1010 (7th Cir. 2002)
(citing Klinghoffer, 739 F. Supp. at 858–59) (―The district court found that [Klinghoffer‘s]
survivors‘ claims were cognizable in federal court under federal admiralty jurisdiction and
the Death on the High Seas Act because the tort occurred in navigable waters.‖); see also
Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, 242 F.R.D. 199, 214 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). For purposes of clarity,
this Note will refer to the Seventh Circuit‘s decision in 2002, which held that there is a
secondary liability cause of action under § 2333(a), as Boim I, and the Seventh Circuit‘s en
banc decision in 2008 (overturning Boim I and holding against permitting secondary
liability) as Boim III. Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev. (Boim III), 549 F.3d
685, 705 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
62. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-1040, at 5 (1992) (―The recent case of the Klinghoffer family
is an example of this gap in our efforts to develop a comprehensive legal response to
international terrorism.‖).
63. See Goldberg v. UBS AG, 660 F. Supp. 2d 410, 421 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); see also H.R.
REP. NO. 102-1040, at 5 (―Only by virtue of the fact that the [Klinghoffer] attack violated
certain Admiralty laws and that the organization involved—the Palestinian Liberation
Organization—had assets and carried on activities in New York, was the court able to
establish jurisdiction over the case. A similar attack occurring on an airplane or in some
other locale might not have been subject to civil action in the U.S. In order to facilitate civil
actions against such terrorists the Committee [on the Judiciary] recommend[ed] [this bill].‖).
64. See, e.g., Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1010; Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp.
2d 1, 55–57 (D.D.C. 2010).
65. See 137 CONG. REC. 4511 (1991). Senator Grassley cited banking information and
subpoenas for financial records as examples of such tools. Id.
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American tort law, including treble damages and attorney‘s fees.‖66
Previously, Senator Grassley had stated that, with the ATA, ―terrorists will
be held accountable where it hurts them most: at their lifeline, their
funds.‖67
In a hearing before the Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative
Practice of the Committee on the Judiciary, Professor Wendy Perdue
advocated for the inclusion of a civil remedy that not only held liable
terrorist organizations, but also ―the organizations, businesses and nations‖
that aided these organizations and likely had reachable assets.68 However,
Perdue acknowledged that § 2333(a) would likely lead to confusion
regarding the subject of secondary liability.69 Senator Grassley brought
these concerns to the attention of Joseph A. Morris, then–General Counsel
of the Information Agency, who also testified at the ATA Senate hearings.70
Morris responded that ―as drafted [the ATA] is powerfully broad‖ and that
it was intended to ―bring [in] all of the substantive law of the American tort
law system.‖71 Morris added that traditional tort law had a principle similar
to criminal law‘s doctrine of aiding and abetting; he claimed that this
principle would therefore apply to the ATA civil provision and suggested
that the provision could be used against negligent defendants.72
Finally, a July 1992 post-enactment Senate Committee Report discussed
the purpose of the ATA, noting that in providing for compensatory and
treble damages and ―impos[ing] . . . liability at any point along the causal
chain of terrorism,‖ the ATA ―would interrupt, or at least imperil, the flow
of money‖ to terrorist organizations.73

66. See id.; see also Goodrow v. Lane Bryant, Inc., 732 N.E.2d 289, 299 (Mass. 2000)
(discussing treble damages‘ punitive nature). Courts differ on the statutory predicate
required for treble damages. See, e.g., Bangert v. Harris, 553 F. Supp. 235, 239 (M.D. Pa.
1982) (holding that specific statutory authorization was needed for a court to award treble
damages).
67. 136 CONG. REC. 14279–84 (1990).
68. See Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 14,
Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002) (Nos. 01-1969, 01-1970) [hereinafter Boim I Brief]
(citing Antiterrorism Act of 1990: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin.
Practice, 101st Cong. 136 (1990) (statement of Professor Wendy Perdue)).
69. 136 CONG. REC. 14279–84.
70. Boim I Brief, supra note 68, at 13–14.
71. See Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 56 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing
Antiterrorism Act of 1990: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative
Practice, 101st Cong. 136 (1990) (statement of Joseph A. Morris, General Counsel, U.S.
Information Agency)); see also Boim I Brief, supra note 68, at 14.
72. See Boim I Brief, supra note 68, at 14 (quoting Morris as stating that ―[t]he tort law
system has similar rules [to criminal law‘s vicarious liability] where liability attaches to
those who knowingly or negligently‖ aid another actor in severely injuring another, and that
―as [the ATA civil provision] is drafted, it brings all of that tort law potential into any of
these civil suits‖).
73. S. REP. NO. 102-342, at 22 (1992). In January 2013, Congress amended the ATA‘s
statute of limitations provision, extending the time period from four years to ten years. See
18 U.S.C. § 2335 (1992); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L.
No. 112-239, 126 Stat. 1632; see also Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 950 F. Supp. 2d 459, 460
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that courts must apply the amended ten-year statute of limitations
retroactively to cases that were pending during or commenced following the amendment
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Currently, there is a potentially game-changing bill before Congress
called the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act74 (JASTA). If passed
in its current form, the bill would explicitly permit a private ATA cause of
action predicated upon a theory of secondary liability. 75 The bill would
amend § 2333 by adding the following: ―In an action arising under
subsection (a), liability may be asserted as to the person or persons who
committed such act of international terrorism or any person or entity that
aided, abetted, or conspired with the person or persons who committed such
an act of international terrorism.‖76
However, the bill is not entirely focused on the secondary liability
issue—a significant portion of the text revolves around stripping sovereign
immunity from countries that engage in acts of terrorism, regardless of
whether they are considered a state sponsor of terrorism.77 JASTA passed
the Senate in December 2014 and in January 2015 was referred to the
House Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice.78
3. The Crime of Material Support to Terrorism
In its current form, the material support law is the product of multiple
attempts to cut off the flow of money and resources to international terrorist
organizations.79 The material support law was first codified in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339A in reaction to the 1993 World Trade Center bombings. 80 At the
time, the law did not criminalize material support to terrorist groups where
the funding party did not specifically intend the groups to use the support
for terrorist attacks or operations.81
date); Abecassis v. Wyatt, No. H-09-3884, 2013 WL 5231543, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 16,
2013).
74. See H.R. 3143, 113th Cong. (2013), available at https://www.congress.gov/
bill/113th-congress/house-bill/3143/all-actions.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id. The passage of JASTA would consequently permit plaintiffs to go after
countries such as Saudi Arabia, which is not on the SST list but has faced accusations of
funding the September 11 attacks. Id.
78. See id.; see also S. 1535, 113th Cong. (2013), available at https://www.congress.
gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/1535/actions.
79. See Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the
Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 4 (2005) (―The material support law is one
part of a matrix of terrorism-support laws that have accrued over many years through the
painstaking efforts of individuals in the executive and legislative branches intent on putting a
stop to the phenomenon of U.S. persons providing support, well-intentioned or otherwise, to
foreign terrorist organizations.‖).
80. Id. at 12; see also Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (1994)). The law was since
amended to define ―material support or resources‖ as including the provision of services and
items falling into four categories: (1) funding; (2) tangible equipment; (3) logistical support;
and (4) personnel. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339(A)(b) (2012); see also Chesney, supra note 79, at
12 n.69.
81. See Chesney, supra note 79, at 13. Under this original version of the material
support law, an individual could donate to a terrorist group as such as Hezbollah, for
example, as long as she believed that the money would only be used for the group‘s social or
political activities. Id.
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To expand the reach of the law, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.82
The new law, while applying only to those providing material support to
groups designated as terrorist organizations by the U.S. Secretary of State,
does not require specific intent to aid acts of terrorism.83 The U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed this interpretation of § 2339B in Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project.84
Section 2339B also contains a civil liability provision.85 However, this
provision does not extend to private plaintiffs—only the government can
bring an action for civil fines in addition to criminal liability. 86 Therefore,
any chance of relief for private plaintiffs who were victims of terrorist
attacks lies solely in § 2333(a).87
Civil remedies for criminal acts can serve as a useful deterrent to criminal
activity.88 In addition, some courts have suggested using the material
support law as the base crime in suits against entities that allegedly
provided money or other resources to terrorist organizations.89 The
Supreme Court in Holder confirmed that § 2339B did not require that the
defendant specifically intend to further terrorist activities—it was sufficient
for a party to know that the group in question was a terrorist group.90 As
Part III discusses, this aspect of Holder is in tension with the ATA‘s
definition of international terrorism.91
B. Secondary Versus Primary Liability, and Why the Difference Matters
This section explains how courts have applied—or chosen not to apply—
secondary liability in different areas of the law.92 This section also briefly
addresses the ways in which victims of terrorism can harness the material
82. Id. at 15–18. However, Chesney notes that the law is narrower in the sense that
§ 2339A can apply to aid given to anyone, while § 2339B is specific to aid given to terrorist
groups. Id. at 18. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (1996) (criminalizing knowingly providing
material support to a U.S.-designated terrorist organization and foregoing a specific intent
requirement), with 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (1994) (permitting charges where the group is not a
U.S.-designated terrorist organization).
83. See Chesney, supra note 79, at 18.
84. 561 U.S. 1, 8 (2010); see also infra Part II.B.1.
85. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(b).
86. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41334, TERRORIST MATERIAL SUPPORT:
A SKETCH OF 18 U.S.C. 2339A AND 2339B, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 5 (2010).
87. See id.
88. See Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 489 (D.C.C. 1983).
89. See Boim III, 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008). See infra Part II.B.1 for further
discussion of Judge Richard Posner‘s ―chain or incorporations‖ approach to holding
organizations secondarily liable under the ATA.
90. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 17–18 (2010). Defendants have
often challenged this absence of a specific intent requirement as unconstitutional. See
generally id.; United States v. Al Kassar, 582 F. Supp. 2d 488, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(―Defendants contend that because Section 2339B does not require a showing of specific
intent to further the illegal activities of a foreign terrorist organization, it violates the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment.‖).
91. See infra Part III.A.2.
92. In particular, the ruling in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994), which concerned secondary liability in private securities fraud
suits, has strongly influenced ATA banking cases. See infra Part I.B.2.a.
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support provision in primary liability causes of action. As Part II
demonstrates, courts have invoked the following theories frequently in
discussing whether or not banks should be held secondarily liable under the
ATA civil provision.
1. The Nature of Secondary Liability
It is crucial to consider the differences between secondary and primary
liability in both civil and criminal law. Many states have accepted the
definition of secondary civil liability articulated in the Second Restatement
of Torts, although this acceptance is by no means unanimous.93 According
to the Restatement, an individual may be secondarily liable for a tort when
that individual (a) commits a tortious act ―in concert‖ with a principal,
(b) knows that the principal‘s conduct is tortious and gives substantial
assistance or encouragement to the principal, or (c) gives such ―substantial
assistance‖ to the principal and separately breaches a duty to the third
person.94
This Note is primarily concerned with subsection (b) of the
Restatement‘s definition, which serves as the civil equivalent of aiding and
abetting liability.95 The Restatement establishes a three-pronged test for
aiding and abetting liability: (1) the principal committed tortious conduct;
(2) the aider had knowledge of the principal‘s conduct; and (3) the aider
gave substantial assistance or encouragement to the principal.96 However,
the Restatement does not explicitly mention any mental state requirement.97
There is no single universal test for civil aiding and abetting liability.98
Nevertheless, in 1983, the D.C. Circuit in Halberstam v. Welch99 provided
some clarity. The Supreme Court would later describe Halberstam as a
―comprehensive opinion on the subject‖ of civil aiding and abetting

93. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979); see also Will Rice,
American & British Insurers and Courts As Aiders and Abettors of Commercial Terrorism, 6
ST. MARY‘S L. REV. ON MINORITY ISSUES 1, 44–47 (2003). In specific relation to aiding and
abetting civil liability, Rice noted that ―[a]lthough many jurisdictions have recognized civil
liability for aiding and abetting in some circumstances where there is proof of ‗substantial
assistance,‘ not all have formally adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(b).‖ Id. at 44
n.190.
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876.
95. See Nathan Isaac Combs, Note, Civil Aiding and Abetting Liability, 58 VAND. L.
REV. 241, 254–55 (2005).
96. See Kevin Bennardo, The Tort of Aiding and Advising?: The Attorney Exception to
Aiding and Abetting a Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 84 N.D. L. REV. 85, 85 (2008) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b)); see also In re Chiquita Brand Int‘l, Inc. Alien
Tort Statute & S‘holder Derivative Litig., Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2010)
(citing Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1983), and applying the test to the
ATA civil provision).
97. See Combs, supra note 95, at 289–90.
98. See id. at 278 (―With the dearth of coherent precedent and the increasing importance
of civil aiding and abetting, courts need a clearer test for liability.‖).
99. 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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liability.100 In Halberstam, the court relied on the Restatement‘s view
when upholding civil aiding and abetting liability and conspiracy liability in
a case where a woman had both knowingly and substantially assisted in a
murder.101 The woman had acted as a banker, bookkeeper, and secretary
for the murderer with the knowledge that her activities helped him in the
commission of illegal acts.102 The court did not require that the prosecution
demonstrate that the defendant specifically intended the principal to commit
murder.103
On the other hand, criminal secondary liability, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2,
is more clear-cut.104 This statute provides that ―whoever commits an
offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands,
induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.‖105 An
aider must manifest specific intent to be liable for aiding and abetting a
crime; this differs from criminal conspiracy liability (another form of
secondary liability), and of course civil aiding and abetting liability.106
Criminal aiding and abetting also does not require a completed crime,
whereas civil aiding and abetting requires the actual commission of a
tort.107 However, as the next section demonstrates, courts have interpreted
the Supreme Court‘s ruling in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver108 as barring the application of § 2(a) to private causes of
action.109
2. Statutory Secondary Liability Analogies: Securities Fraud and RICO
This section considers two statutory analogies that courts have commonly
invoked in evaluating the viability of secondary liability suits against banks
under the ATA.

100. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 181 (1994).
See infra Part I.B.2.a for an in-depth discussion of this case‘s handling of secondary liability
under federal securities law.
101. Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 487–89.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 488.
104. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
105. Id. § 2(a). Title 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) also provides that ―whoever willfully causes an act
to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the
United States, is punishable as a principal.‖
106. See Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949); United States v.
Turner, 583 F.3d 1062, 1067 (8th Cir. 2009). Conspiracy to provide material support to
terrorism occurs when a party agrees to provide such support; it is an inchoate crime,
meaning that mere planning is sufficient and the actual completion of an act is unnecessary
for liability. See DOYLE, supra note 86, at 2. Furthermore, conspirators may be held liable
for the original scheme as well as any foreseeable consequences carried out in the
commission of the scheme. Id. This Note, however, focuses on aiding and abetting liability
as opposed to conspiracy.
107. See Combs, supra note 95, at 280.
108. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
109. See, e.g., Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 155 F.3d 644, 656 (3d Cir.
1998) (citing Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 181–82
(1994)).
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a. Central Bank and Secondary Liability in Securities Fraud Cases
In 1994, the Supreme Court held in Central Bank that section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934110 did not provide for secondary
liability claims in private securities fraud suits.111 As a result, the plaintiffs
were unable to sue on the theory that the defendant, the Central Bank of
Denver, had aided and abetted the other defendants in committing securities
fraud.112
The plaintiffs, the First Interstate Bank of Denver and Jack K. Naber, had
purchased $2.1 million in bonds from the Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills
Public Building Authority.113 The Central Bank of Denver served as the
indenture trustee for the bonds at issue, and the public building authority
defaulted soon afterward.114 Before the default, the bank discovered that
the land used to secure the bonds was possibly insufficient, thereby
necessitating a new appraisal on the bonds.115 However, no such appraisal
ever took place.116
The District of Colorado granted the Central Bank of Denver‘s motion
for summary judgment; however, the Tenth Circuit reversed the decision on
the basis that the circuit had previously permitted private aiding and
abetting actions under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.117 It is
illegal to ―directly or indirectly‖ engage in conduct meeting the elements of
securities fraud under section 10(b), as well as Securities Exchange
Commission Rule 10b-5.118 Other federal courts had also permitted private

110. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881.
111. See generally Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. 164.
112. Id. at 191.
113. Id. at 167–68.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 167.
116. Id. at 167–68.
117. Id. at 166–168. Section 10(b) is the general antifraud provision of the 1934 Act. Id.
at 171. The Tenth Circuit rule permitted a section 10(b) aiding and abetting cause of action
consisting of the following elements: ―(1) a primary violation of § 10(b); (2) recklessness by
the aider and abettor as to the existence of the primary violation; and (3) substantial
assistance given to the primary violator by the aider and abettor.‖ Id. at 168. The 1934 Act
generally regulates post-distribution trading, while its predecessor, the Securities Act of
1933, regulates the initial distribution of securities. Id. at 171 (citing Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 752 (1975)); see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881; Securities Exchange Act of 1933, Title I, Pub. L. No. 7322, 48 Stat. 74.
118. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange . . .To use or employ, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). Rule 10b-5 contains similar language and also lacks an explicit
private right of action. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014).
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aiding and abetting claims under section 10(b).119 These interpretations
relied upon the argument that Congress had enacted the 1934 Act to meet
broad policy objectives, and that permitting private secondary liability
actions would be in line with such objectives.120 The tide began to turn in
the years before the Supreme Court‘s Central Bank holding, as some
federal appellate courts began to question other circuits‘ earlier rulings in
favor of secondary liability.121
In its Central Bank decision, the Supreme Court sought to resolve the
split among the circuits respecting a private cause of action for secondary
liability under section 10(b).122 The Supreme Court itself had previously
inferred a private right of action in securities fraud cases.123 However,
Congress never advised courts on how far to extend private liability.124
Therefore, in Central Bank the Court was extremely hesitant to infer a
private right of action based on secondary liability without clear statutory
language establishing any private right in the first place.125 Writing for the
Court, Justice Anthony Kennedy held that Congress did not intend to create
an aiding and abetting private cause of action under section 10(b).126
The plaintiffs in Central Bank used the ―directly or indirectly‖ language
of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to assert that the statutory text supported
secondary liability.127 The Court found this argument unpersuasive.128 The
Court also looked to those sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts that did
expressly provide for a private right of action to further support its

119. See, e.g., Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774, 777 (1st Cir. 1983); Kerbs v. Fall
River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731, 740 (10th Cir. 1974); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life
Ins. Co, 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966), aff‟d, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969).
120. See, e.g., SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1311 n.12 (9th Cir. 1982).
121. See, e.g., Akin v. Q-L Invs., Inc. 959 F.2d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting the
―powerful argument‖ that ―aider and abettor liability should not be enforceable by private
parties pursuing an implied right of action‖); Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt,
797 F.2d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1986) (effectively eliminating secondary liability in securities
cases through its holding that a deceptive or manipulative act was required for section 10(b)
liability).
122. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 170 (1994).
123. See Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9
(1971) (finding an implied private right of action under section 10(b)).
124. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 173 (―Congress did not create a private § 10(b) cause of
action and had no occasion to provide guidance about the elements of a private liability
scheme.‖).
125. Id.
126. See id. at 177.
127. Id. at 175–76.
128. Id. at 176. The court noted that there was ―a basic flaw with this interpretation.‖ Id.
For example, permitting an aiding and abetting action extends the statute to persons who do
not engage in fraud or deception at all, ―but who give a degree of aid to those who do.‖ Id.
Such an interpretation would also do away with the established reliance element of Rule
10b-5. Id. at 180 (―Our reasoning is confirmed by the fact that respondents‘ argument would
impose 10b–5 aiding and abetting liability when at least one element critical for recovery
under 10b–5 is absent: reliance.‖ (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988))).
The Court concluded that ―the text of the 1934 Act does not itself reach those who aid and
abet a § 10(b) violation. Unlike those courts [recognizing an aiding and abetting action],
however, we think that conclusion resolves the case.‖ Id. at 177.
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conclusion.129 Finding that these sections failed to address aiding and
abetting liability, the Court concluded that Congress had not intended
aiding and abetting liability under section 10(b).130
Finally, the Court rejected the plaintiffs‘ argument that the Acts‘
legislative history supported an aiding and abetting private cause of action,
finding that neither section 10(b)‘s text nor history implied that aiding and
abetting was included in the Act.131 The plaintiffs argued that Congress
had intended to imbue the 1933 and 1934 Acts with general tort law
principles and asserted that aiding and abetting liability was ―well
established in both civil and criminal actions by 1934.‖132 After analyzing
aiding and abetting liability under both tort and criminal law theory, the
Court dispatched this argument as well.133 The Court, in the end, found that
there was no general presumption in favor of aiding and abetting liability
and that the plaintiffs had not provided sufficient evidence of congressional
intent to rebut this presumption.134
As Part II discusses in detail, since Central Bank many courts have
analogized private securities fraud suits to private suits under the ATA civil
provision.135 Part II demonstrates how Central Bank has served as the
cornerstone for arguments against holding banks secondarily liable under
the ATA, while proponents of secondary liability have instead attempted to
distinguish section 10(b) from § 2333(a).136
b. RICO and Secondary Liability
In 1970, Congress enacted RICO via the Organized Crime Control
Act.137 The statute provides for both criminal and civil penalties on entities
or individuals engaged in racketeering activity, which the law broadly
defines to include many kinds of criminal activity.138 At the time, the law
primarily targeted organized crime throughout the United States.139 RICO
makes illegal many kinds of racketeering activity performed ―directly or
indirectly,‖ including, under certain circumstances, investing income
derived from racketeering or participating in the conducting of an
129. Id. at 178.
130. Id. at 179.
131. Id. at 183–84.
132. Id. at 180–81 (citing Brief for SEC As Amicus Curiae on behalf of PetitionerAppellants at 10, Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (No. 92-854)).
133. Id. 181–83.
134. Id. at 182.
135. See infra Part II.B.
136. See infra Part II.
137. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961–1968 (1970)).
138. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1961, ―racketeering activity‖ includes crimes such as ―any act or
threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in
obscene matter, or dealing in a controlled substance or listed chemical . . . which is
chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year‖ as well
as an extensive list of other crimes under Title 18 of the U.S. Code.
139. See 2 OTTO G. OBERMAIER & ROBERT G. MORVILLO, WHITE COLLAR CRIME:
BUSINESS AND REGULATORY OFFENSES § 11.03, at 11-6 (2006).
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enterprise‘s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.140 The RICO
civil provision states that ―[a]ny person injured in his business or property
by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in
any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the
damages he sustains and the cost of the suit.‖141
Although prosecutors did not initially harness the full potential of RICO,
today the law is used against various types of crime and not necessarily
organized crime.142 The initial targeting of mob crime has been expanded
to include white collar crime and terrorism.143 There is ongoing debate
over whether civil RICO should be primarily applied to organized crime
groups or further extended to include corporate entities, such as banks.144
In recent years, some courts have sought to limit civil RICO‘s breadth.145
As with the ATA, and as Part II discusses further, courts have limited the
application of aiding and abetting liability in civil RICO suits using the
Supreme Court‘s Central Bank ruling, comparing the RICO civil provision
to private securities fraud suits under section 10(b).146 For example, in
1996, a court in the Southern District of New York held that civil aiding
and abetting liability was not permissible under the RICO civil provision,
finding, as the Supreme Court did in Central Bank, that the provision‘s
silence on secondary liability was likely intentional.147 The Third Circuit,
in Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust,148 also held that courts
should not infer aiding and abetting liability in civil RICO suits.149
140. 18 U.S.C. § 1962.
141. Id. § 1964. The provision adds that such recovery shall include reasonable
attorney‘s fees, but with the qualification that ―no person may rely upon any conduct that
would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities to establish a
violation of section 1962.‖ Id. This securities fraud exception does not stand, however, with
regard to any person criminally convicted for such fraud. Id.
142. See 2 OBERMAIER & MORVILLO, supra note 139.
143. See H.J. Inc. v Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 248 (1989) (recognizing that
although RICO is focused on targeting organized crime, it is not limited to organized crime);
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 495 (1985) (holding that RICO applies to all
criminals, not only those involved in organized crime).
144. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499 (noting that RICO civil suits ―are being brought almost
solely against [business enterprises], rather than against the archetypal, intimidating
mobster‖).
145. This includes the Supreme Court. See Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S.
451, 453 (2006) (relying on Holmes v. Sec. Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992),
to limit civil RICO‘s applicability only to those victims who could prove a direct injury
resulting from a RICO violation).
146. See generally 8 JEROLD S. SOLOVY & R. DOUGLAS REES, BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL
LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS § 96 (Robert L. Haig ed., 3d. ed. 2005).
147. Dep‘t of Econ. Dev. v. Andersen, 924 F. Supp. 449, 475–77 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(finding that ―there is no reason to believe that the omission of language in RICO covering
aiders and abettors was inadvertent‖). But see In re Melridge, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 93-36184,
1996 WL 138468, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 27, 1996) (finding that the Supreme Court‘s decision
in Central Bank was only relevant to Rule 10b-5 and not RICO).
148. 155 F.3d 644 (3d Cir. 1998).
149. Id. at 657 (―We conclude that the same analysis [as the Court used in Central Bank]
controls our construction of the civil RICO provision.‖); see also Pa. Ass‘n of Edwards Heirs
v. Rightenour, 235 F.3d 839, 844 (3d Cir. 2000) (affirming Rolo and clarifying that Rolo also
applied in common law–based RICO cases).
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Courts have also interpreted RICO civil suits to require clear evidence of
proximate cause.150 As Part II demonstrates, this has impacted courts‘
understanding of ATA primary liability requirements.151
C. Some Background on Banks
This section considers background information on the banking industry
that is particularly relevant to secondary liability civil suits against banks
under the ATA.
1. Routine Versus Nonroutine Banking Services
As discussed in this Note‘s Introduction, whether a bank provides a
terrorist entity with routine services versus nonroutine services could
determine the outcome of an ATA civil suit.152 Routine banking services
include the maintenance of bank accounts, the collection and transmission
of funds, and the provision of account credit card services for clients.153
Nonroutine banking services extend beyond the realm of typical bank
services, suggesting a more hands-on approach with greater client
interaction and involvement.154
Some courts have declined to hold negligent banks liable for injuries
linked to funds provided through routine banking services.155 In In re
Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001,156 the Second Circuit pointed to
the bank‘s use of routine banking services only as evidence that the link
between the bank and the injury was too tenuous to afford the plaintiffs

150. See supra note 35 and accompanying text; see also Reynolds v. E. Dyer Dev. Co.,
882 F.2d 1249, 1253 (7th Cir. 1989); Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1189 (4th Cir.
1988) (―Civil RICO is of course a statutory tort remedy—simply one with particularly
drastic remedies. Causation principles generally applicable to tort liability must be
considered applicable. These require not only cause-in-fact, but ‗legal‘ or ‗proximate‘ cause
as well, the latter involving a policy rather than a purely factual determination: ‗whether the
conduct has been so significant and important a cause that the defendant should be held
responsible.‘‖ (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 42, at 272 (5th ed. 1984))).
151. See infra Part II.B.2.a for discussion of Rothstein‘s holding on primary liability.
152. See supra Introduction.
153. Jason Binimow, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 2333(a), Which Allows U.S. Nationals Who Have Been Injured “By Reason of Act of
International Terrorism” to Sue Therefor and Recover Treble Damages, 195 A.L.R. FED.
217 (2004). In Weiss v. National Westminster Bank PLC, the defendant bank argued that the
material support provision did not include routine banking services as a prohibited activity;
the court found this particular argument unpersuasive. 453 F. Supp. 2d 609, 624–25
(E.D.N.Y 2006).
154. For additional discussion of such non-routine measures as explained in Linde v. Arab
Bank, see infra notes 163–66.
155. See In Re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 714 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2013);
Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 86, 109 (D.D.C. 2003) (―Plaintiffs
offer no support, and we have found none, for the proposition that a bank is liable for
injuries done with money that passes through its hands in the form of deposits, withdrawals,
check clearing services, or any other routine banking service.‖).
156. 714 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2013).
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relief.157 However, the fact that a bank provided services considered to be
routine commercial transactions does not per se exempt a bank from
liability.158 Although some routine banking services might qualify to
establish primary liability for material support to terrorism, courts must still
consider whether the services met the threshold for ―substantial assistance‖
when evaluating under a secondary liability theory.159 In other words,
although the routine nature of a bank‘s actions is not necessarily
dispositive, activities that are regarded as typical day-to-day services can
demonstrate that the bank had no knowledge that it was aiding a terrorist
act.160
Alternatively, the presence of more unusual and specific services can
suggest just the opposite—that the bank knew that its services were aiding
terrorism.161 The court in Linde v. Arab Bank162 found that the defendant
bank‘s alleged actions far exceeded what is considered routine.163 The
Jordan-based Arab Bank has been at the center of many civil suits aimed at
bringing justice to terrorism victims.164 In Linde, the plaintiffs, who were
victims or family of victims killed in Hamas-orchestrated terrorist attacks,
filed a lawsuit charging the Arab Bank with violating § 2333(a).165 The
plaintiffs alleged that the banks had knowingly provided banking services
to Hamas, charities that financially supported the terrorist groups
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Hamas, as well as the Saudi Committee
in Support of the Intifada al Quds, a group that the plaintiffs alleged
provided martyr insurance to the families of Hamas suicide bombers.166
157. Id. at 123–25. The court relied on Rothstein‘s holding that plaintiffs must
demonstrate proximate cause to advance a primary liability cause of action under § 2333(a).
Id.; see also infra Part II.B. Although the court here was dismissing a primary liability claim
against the bank, Parts II and III of this Note further explain how the primary liability
requirements also relate to ATA secondary liability.
158. See Sabine Michalowski, No Complicity Liability for Funding Gross Human Rights
Violations?, 30 BERKELEY J. INT‘L L. 451, 507 (2012) (citing In re Terrorist Attacks on
September 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 832–34 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)); see also In re Terrorist
Attacks on September 11, 2001, 718 F. Supp. 2d 456, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Almog v. Arab
Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 291 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Weiss v. Nat‘l Westminster Bank
PLC, 453 F. Supp. 2d 609, 625 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., No. CV06-0702 (CPS), 2006 WL 2862704, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2006); Linde v. Arab Bank,
PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 588 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
159. See Michalowski, supra note 158, at 487; see also Goldberg v. UBS AG, 660 F.
Supp. 2d 410, 425 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that the defendant‘s performance of three wire
transfers for a terrorist group‘s fundraising organization did not fulfill the ―substantial
assistance‖ element of tort aiding and abetting liability).
160. See Michalowski, supra note 158, at 487.
161. See id.
162. 384 F. Supp. 2d 571 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
163. See id. at 588 (―Given plaintiffs‘ allegations regarding the knowing and intentional
nature of [Arab] Bank‘s activities, there is nothing ‗routine‘ about the services the Bank is
alleged to provide.‖).
164. See Anti-Terrorism Act Liability for Financial Institutions, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL
LLP, Sept. 24, 2014, at 2, available at http://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/
SC_Publication_Anti_Terrorism_Act_Liability_for_Financial_Institutions.pdf.
165. See Linde, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 575.
166. See id. at 576–77. The court noted that although the plaintiffs occasionally referred
to the payments to the bombers‘ families as insurance, the ―scheme is not alleged to be a
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In a similar case, Almog v. Arab Bank,167 the plaintiffs also alleged the
bank‘s involvement with the Saudi Committee.168 In both cases, the Arab
Bank argued that such services were merely routine—and in both cases, the
court did not agree.169 The court in Almog explained that the difference
between routine and nonroutine was tied to the ―knowing and intentional
nature of the Bank‘s activities.‖170
This conclusion supports the
understanding that the type of services that a bank provides a terrorist group
is not automatically indicative of knowledge or intent but can help create a
strong presumption of the institution‘s mental state.171
2. Reliance on List-Making Post–September 11
After September 11, the United States succeeded in enacting some of the
changes to the financial system that it had struggled to implement before
the terrorist attacks.172 The government was assertive in identifying
terrorism‘s financial backers and freezing these entities‘ assets.173 In 2004,
the 9/11 Commission reported that the majority of U.S. financial
institutions had cooperated extensively with the government to patch up
vulnerabilities in the U.S. financial system.174 Yet, with these successes
came other consequences—terrorist organizations proved adaptable at
finding other methods of raising money where traditional systems had
failed.175
Following the USA PATRIOT Act‘s enactment in 2001,176 the Treasury
Department promulgated several regulations to more stringently monitor
money laundering and terrorism financing.177 Post–September 11, the U.S.
approach to regulating terrorism financing has largely centered upon a
practice of list-making.178 The U.S. Secretary of State places groups on the
traditional pooled risk insurance plan,‖ but rather a reward for those who committed suicide
attacks. Id. at 577.
167. See Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
168. Id. at 262–63; Michalowski, supra note 158, at 488–89.
169. See Michalowski, supra note 158, at 488–89.
170. Almog, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 291.
171. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
172. See NAT‘L COMM‘N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., supra note 17, at 381.
173. Id. at 382.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 383.
176. President George W. Bush signed the PATRIOT Act on October 26, 2001, which
criminalized terrorism financing. Congress has renewed and added to the Act since then,
and it remains in effect today. See supra note 51 and accompanying text; see also Pub. L.
No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); USA PATRIOT Act, U.S. DEP‘T OF TREASURY, FIN. CRIMES
ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/patriot/index.html?r=1&id=
352#352 (last visited Apr. 23, 2015) (identifying and explaining the PATRIOT Act sections
affecting financial institutions).
177. The crime of money laundering occurs when individuals or organizations make their
illegally obtained funds appear to be legally obtained; in other words, when an entity makes
―dirty money‖ appear to be clean. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–1957 (2012). The crime requires a
predicate offense, which can be, but is not limited to, murder, kidnapping, arson, robbery,
bribery, extortion, and drug dealing. Id.
178. See Terrorist Financing, supra note 16, at 9.
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Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations list (―FTOs list‖), while OFAC,
under IEEPA authority, maintains the Specially Designated Global
Terrorists list (―SDGT list‖).179
The SDGT list was born out of an executive order that grants OFAC the
authority to freeze the bank accounts and block the assets of entities
appearing on this list.180 It applies only to U.S. persons and U.S. financial
institutions.181 The SDGT list incorporates the State Department‘s FTO list
as well as numerous other individuals and groups.182 OFAC also maintains
a master list called the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons
list (―SDN list‖), which combines OFAC and State Department lists,
including the SST list.183
The SST list was created under the authority of section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act, which empowers the Secretary of State to designate
certain countries as state sponsors of terrorism.184 A country is designated
a state sponsor of terrorism when the U.S. Secretary of State determines
that the country‘s government ―repeatedly provided support for acts of
international terrorism.‖185 As of early 2015, the SST list includes only
Iran, Sudan, Syria, and Cuba.186 OFAC has consequently enacted
counterterrorism sanctions against these countries.187
3. Are Banks the Best Chance of Redress for Victims of Terrorism?
The ATA‘s legislative history indicates that Congress intended to provide
victims of international terrorism with tools for civil redress.188 Parts of
this history directly address terrorism financing.189 In an amicus brief
submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs-petitioners in Boim v. Quranic Literacy
Institute (Boim I),190 the United States argued that secondary liability would
179. See id. at 9–11; see also 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1702 (2012) (permitting the prosecution
of individuals who willfully conduct financial transactions with groups or individuals whom
the President considers to be a national security threat).
180. See Terrorist Financing, supra note 16, at 11; see also Exec. Order No. 13,224, 15
C.F.R. pt. 744.12 (2001).
181. See id.; see also Weiss v. Nat‘l Westminster Bank, PLC, 936 F. Supp. 2d 100, 118
(E.D.N.Y. 2013), vacated and remanded, 768 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2014).
182. See Terrorist Financing, supra note 16, at 11.
183. See U.S. DEP‘T OF TREASURY, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL SPECIALLY
DESIGNATED NATIONALS AND BLOCKED PERSONS LIST (Jan. 2, 2015), available at
https://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/t11sdn.pdf; see also AUDREY KURTH CRONIN ET
AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32120, THE ―FTO LIST‖ AND CONGRESS: SANCTIONING
DESIGNATED FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 4–5,
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32120.pdf.
184. 50 U.S.C. § 2405(j); see also Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72,
93 Stat. 503 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401–2420).
185. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(h)(6) (2012).
186. See State Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/
j/ct/list/c14151.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2015).
187. See Levin v. Bank of N.Y., No. 09 CV 5900 RPP, 2011 WL 812032, at *13
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2011).
188. See supra Part I.A.2.
189. See supra note 73.
190. 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002).
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better promote Congress‘s objective of compensating terrorism victims and
deterring international terrorism.191 In enacting the ATA, Congress may
have intended to deter not only terrorist organizations themselves but also
terrorism‘s financial backers.192
Secondary liability for banks under the ATA arguably provides the best
chance of redress for terrorism victims.193 This argument is typically based
on the understanding that banks have ―deep pockets‖ and therefore are
capable of paying damages awards.194 Notably, most plaintiffs have been
unable to collect court judgments against state sponsors of terrorism. 195
State defendants have generally defaulted, and their assets have typically
been unreachable.196 For example, in 2012 in Wultz v. Islamic Republic of
Iran,197 a federal district court ordered Iran and Syria (both U.S.-designated
state sponsors of terrorism)198 to pay the plaintiffs $300 million in punitive
damages.199 Given that the likelihood of recovery from terrorist states is
dim, victims may prefer a judgment against a bank.200
The court in Boim v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development
(Boim III) noted the difficulty in collecting judgments against terrorists or
their organizations directly.201 The court concluded that suing the financial
backers of terrorism would have a more powerful deterrent effect and
would serve to ―cut the terrorists‘ lifeline.‖202 In addition, the court found
that providing financial aid to a terrorist group, while not inherently violent,
could be considered dangerous to human life, as ―[g]iving money to
Hamas‖ was ―like giving a loaded gun to a child.‖203 Boim I also noted that
191. Boim I Brief, supra note 68, at 18–19.
192. Van Schaack, supra note 53, at 392–93 (―The hope was that allowing civil liability
would provide an extra measure of deterrence, especially for entities that might financially
support acts of terrorism while not engaging in violent acts directly.‖).
193. See Jack D. Smith & Gregory J. Cooper, Disrupting Terrorist Financing with Civil
Litigation, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L. 65, 80 (2009).
194. See Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 61 (D.D.C. 2010).
195. See Smith & Cooper, supra note 193, at 79.
196. See JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31258, SUITS AGAINST
TERRORIST STATES BY VICTIMS OF TERRORISM, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS (2008), available
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL31258.pdf (―The limited availability of defendant
States‘ assets for satisfaction of judgments has made collection difficult.‖); see also Boim III,
549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008).
197. 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 61 (D.D.C. 2010).
198. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
199. Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 864 F. Supp. 2d 24, 42 (D.D.C. 2012). The court
reviled Syria and Iran, stating: ―When a state chooses to use terror as a policy tool—as Iran
and Syria continue to do—that state forfeits its sovereign immunity and deserves unadorned
condemnation. Barbaric acts like [the suicide attack that killed Daniel Wultz] have no place
in civilized society and represent a moral depravity that knows no bounds.‖ Id. at 43.
200. See Smith & Cooper, supra note 193, at 80.
201. See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 690 (―Damages are a less effective remedy against
terrorists and their organizations than against their financial angels.‖). For other examples
demonstrating the difficulty in collecting such judgments, see generally Ungar v. Palestine
Liberation Organization, 402 F.3d 274, 276 (1st Cir. 2005); Biton v. Palestinian Interim
Self-Government Authority, 252 F.R.D. 1, 1 (D.D.C. 2008); Knox v. Palestine Liberation
Organization, 248 F.R.D. 420, 423 (S.D.N.Y 2008).
202. Boim III, 549 F.3d at 691.
203. Id. at 690.
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it would be ―bizarre‖ for Congress to enact a statute where collecting
damages would be so unlikely.204
Finally, the burden of proof in civil suits is lower than in criminal
cases.205 Thus, civil suits likely provide a better opportunity to hold
terrorism aiders and abettors accountable than criminal prosecutions.206
There are also potential arguments against propping up banks as a
potential target in terrorism suits.207 U.S. plaintiffs suing foreign banks
may lead to complicated issues of international diplomacy. 208 One
argument is that Congress did not intend for banks to be included as a
potential defendant class under § 2333(a).209 Furthermore, banks have
defended themselves against civil suits by arguing that they complied with
the regulations of the country where the bank was located.210 Finally, in
pursuing banks under a secondary liability theory, there exists a risk that
courts could impose unjust costs on innocent financial institutions that
provide necessary economic services to society.211
II. THE CONFLICTING CASE LAW ON ATA SECONDARY LIABILITY
This part looks closer at the split among federal courts on ATA
secondary liability in private civil suits. Part II.A presents the most
significant case law in favor of secondary liability, focusing on Wultz and
Boim I.212 Part II.B then presents the case law holding against secondary
liability, with a focus on the Second Circuit‘s ruling in Rothstein v. UBS
AG213 and the Seventh Circuit‘s overturning of Boim I in Boim III, its en
banc rehearing of the case.
A. The Case Law Permitting Private ATA Suits
Under a Secondary Liability Theory
This section addresses those courts that have held in favor of secondary
liability. Although the defendant in the Boim case was a charity, and not a
204. Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000, 1021 (7th Cir. 2002).
205. See Smith & Cooper, supra note 193, at 74. The standard for civil suits is ―clear and
convincing evidence‖ or a ―preponderance of evidence‖ rather than proof ―beyond a
reasonable doubt.‖ Id.
206. See Adam B. Weiss, From the Bonannos to the bin Ladens: The Reves Operation or
Management Test and the Viability of Civil RICO Suits Against Financial Supporters of
Terrorism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1123, 1165 (2010).
207. See generally Sant, supra note 14 (presenting several reasons why banks should not
be targeted under the ATA).
208. See, e.g., Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 950 F. Supp. 2d 459, 460 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
209. Id. at 535, 544–45 (arguing that the ATA civil provision was enacted as a largely
symbolic law, intended to target terrorist actors and not banks).
210. See, e.g., Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 523, 538 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)
(finding that ―[c]ompliance with Lebanese law sheds light on the Bank‘s mental state‖);
Weiss v. Nat‘l Westminster Bank, 936 F. Supp. 2d 100, 111, 116–117 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)
(discussing Natwest‘s argument that it should not be held liable under the ATA, as it had not
conducted business with any U.K.-designated terrorist groups).
211. See Sant, supra note 14, at 599.
212. Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002).
213. 708 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2013).
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bank, courts have applied the Boim I and Boim III rulings on secondary
liability to cases involving banks.214 While the Seventh Circuit eventually
shifted its stance in Boim III, its original holding in Boim I laid the
framework for other holdings permitting secondary liability. This section
focuses on the D.C. District Court‘s ruling in Wultz.
The Boim story began with the 1996 killing of David Boim, a dual
American and Israeli citizen, near Jerusalem.215 In 2000, David‘s parents
filed a lawsuit against the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and
Development and other defendants.216 The family alleged that Hamas was
responsible for David‘s death and that the defendants had provided financial
support to the organization in violation of § 2333(a).217 The district court
denied the defendants‘ motion to dismiss the complaint, and the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the district court‘s ruling, finding that the ATA civil
provision provided for a secondary liability private cause of action.218
The Wultz court frequently refers to the Boim I ruling.219 In 2006,
sixteen-year-old Daniel Wultz was eating at a restaurant in Tel Aviv, Israel,
with his father when a member of PIJ approached the restaurant.220 When a
security guard at the restaurant‘s entrance stopped the man, he detonated
five kilograms of explosives, killing himself and ten others, including
Daniel.221
In 2008, Daniel‘s parents filed a $300 million civil suit under the ATA
against Iran, Syria, and Bank of China.222 The plaintiffs argued that Bank
of China aided and abetted PIJ in its execution of the terrorist attack that
killed their son.223 Under this theory, the plaintiffs contended that Bank of
China should be held liable because its provision of financial services to the

214. See infra Part II.A–B.
215. Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1002.
216. Id. at 1003. The family also sued the Quranic Literacy Institute, the American
Muslim Society, and Muhammad Salah, a former employee of the Quranic Literacy Institute.
See Mike Robinson, Court Upholds $156M Palestinian Terror Verdict, USA TODAY (Dec. 3,
2008), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-12-03-3866513362_x.htm.
217. Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1002–03.
218. See id. at 1021.
219. See generally Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010).
220. See Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 864 F. Supp. 2d 24, 27 (D.D.C. 2012).
Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip formed PIJ in the 1970s with the purpose of establishing
an Islamic state and launching attacks against Israeli civilian and military targets; Iran is the
main financial backer of the group. See Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), NAT‘L
COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/pij.html (last visited Apr. 23,
2015).
221. Raphael Ahern, US Court Orders Syria to Pay $330 Million to Bereaved Family of
2006 TA Bombing Victim, TIMES OF ISRAEL (May 15, 2012), http://www.timesofisrael.
com/us-court-orders-syria-to-pay-330-million-to-bereaved-family-of-2006-ta-suicidebombing/. Following his death, Abu Nasser, one of the leaders of a terrorist group linked
with the PIJ, declared Daniel the ―best target combination we can dream of—American and
Zionist.‖ See Aaron Klein, Comatose Florida Teen „Best Target We Can Dream Of,‟
WORLDNETDAILY (Apr. 27, 2006), http://www.wnd.com/2006/04/35925/.
222. See Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 18. The plaintiffs pleaded in the alternative that Bank
of China was directly liable under the ATA as well as liable under Israeli law. Id.
223. Id. at 19.
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PIJ furthered an act of international terrorism.224 The plaintiffs claimed that
prior to the attack that killed Daniel, Bank of China had executed dozens of
wire transfers for a PIJ agent that amounted to millions of dollars.225 They
also contended that the bank had known that it was providing services to a
terrorist group but had persisted with its actions anyway.226 Bank of China
contended that an aiding and abetting cause of action did not exist under the
ATA and moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim.227
The Wultz court held for the plaintiffs.228 The court‘s ruling hinged on
its determination that courts should treat the ATA civil provision differently
than the Supreme Court had treated the 1934 Act‘s section 10(b) in Central
Bank.229 The Wultz court noted that it was wary of inferring aiding and
abetting liability following Central Bank.230 Nevertheless, the court drew
the same line between the ATA and private securities fraud suits that the
Boim I court had drawn previously.231
Bank of China argued that the court should interpret Central Bank as
totally precluding any secondary liability reading when such a theory was
not explicitly laid out in the statute.232 The court agreed that there was a
general presumption against aiding and abetting liability when the statute
did not expressly provide for such liability.233 However, the court
determined that this presumption was rebuttable where there was strong
evidence of congressional intent to permit secondary liability.234
Wultz‘s rationale for rebutting Central Bank‘s presumption arose directly
from Boim I‘s analysis.235 Boim I found that Central Bank‘s holding
―provide[d] guidance but [was] not determinative‖ because it addressed a
224. Id. at 54. This theory contrasts with the plaintiffs‘ simultaneously pleaded theory
that the bank‘s provision of funds was in itself an act of terrorism under the ATA. Id. at 19.
225. Id. at 44–45; Jesse D. H. Snyder, Reading Between the Lines: Statutory Silence and
Congressional Intent Under the Antiterrorism Act, 1 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUDIES 265, 286
(2012).
226. Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 46 (―Israeli officials allegedly informed China, which
informed [Bank of China], that the transfers were enabling the terrorist activities of the
PIJ.‖).
227. Id. at 54. Bank of China only argued that the secondary liability claim did not exist
under the ATA and did not alternatively argue that the plaintiffs failed to plead the necessary
elements of the claim, should it exist. Id. at 57.
228. Id. at 82.
229. Id. at 54–56. See supra Part II.B.2.a for an overview of Central Bank‘s holding on
secondary liability for private securities fraud claims.
230. Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 54. See supra Part I.B.2.a for a discussion of Central
Bank.
231. Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 54.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 55 (citing Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate of Denver, 511 U.S. 164,
182 (1994)).
234. Id. at 57. Similarly, other courts have applied secondary liability in the face of
statutory silence despite Central Bank. See, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat‘l Bank Ltd., 504
F.3d 254, 282 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that Central Bank‘s presumption was rebutted by an
international norm recognizing claims of aiding and abetting violations of international law).
235. Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 55; see also Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 474,
500 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (observing that Wultz relied on Boim I‘s reasoning and finding that
§ 2333(a) provided for secondary liability).
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statute that only inferred a private right of action, whereas § 2333(a)‘s
private right of action was explicit.236 Such reasoning suggests that the
difference between implied and express private rights of action is sufficient
to distinguish Central Bank from ATA civil litigation.237
Wultz likewise determined that Congress had intended for the ATA to be
construed broadly using traditional tort law principles; for this reason, the
D.C. District Court permitted the aiding and abetting claim against Bank of
China.238 This argument is closely linked with those courts‘ assertions that
the ATA is distinguishable from the 1933 and 1934 Acts and is therefore
outside of Central Bank‘s control.239
The court in Boim I insisted that the ATA‘s legislative history evinces
clear intent to incorporate the full apparatus of traditional tort law into the
ATA.240 Wultz also relied on Senator Grassley‘s statement that the ATA
provides victims of international terrorism with ―all the weapons‖ available
to civil plaintiffs241 as well as the ―remedies of American tort law‖242 as
evidence that Congress intended to include secondary liability in the
statute.243 Logic would seem to dictate that if Congress intended the ATA
to incorporate all of the elements of traditional tort law, then it must have
intended aiding and abetting theory—viable under traditional tort law—to
apply to cases involving banks and international terrorism.244 The
legislature‘s discussion of the ―causal chain of terrorism‖ would necessarily
include aiders and abettors.245
The court in Goldberg v. UBS AG246 noted that the ATA‘s legislative
history and language reflect an intention to give U.S. nationals broad
opportunities for relief.247 The courts in Wultz and Boim I also made such a
connection, arguing that Congress‘s intent supported an accurate
interpretation of the ATA‘s language.248 Wultz found that the ATA civil
provision did not place any limits on a potential defendant because the
language only required that the plaintiff be injured ―by reason of an act of
international terrorism.‖249 In supporting this conclusion, the court cited
236. Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000, 1019 (7th Cir. 2002).
237. Gill, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 500 (discussing the Wultz argument in favor of
distinguishing ATA cases from Central Bank).
238. See Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 55; see also Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1019.
239. See supra Part II.A.
240. Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1010 (citing 137 CONG. REC. 4511 (1991)).
241. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
243. Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 56 (citing 137 CONG. REC. 4511).
244. See, e.g., id. at 55; Boim I Brief, supra note 68, at 9–10.
245. See supra note 73 and accompanying text; see also Boim I Brief, supra note 68, at
17.
246. 660 F. Supp. 2d 410 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
247. Id. at 422 (finding that the ATA‘s ―legislative history as well as the language of the
statute‖ suggested an intent to provide plaintiffs with ―broad remedies in a procedurally
privileged U.S. forum‖). However, Goldberg did not rule directly on the question of
whether the ATA provided for secondary liability.
248. Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 55.
249. Id.; see also supra note 35 and accompanying text. This ―by reason of‖ language is
common to a number of statutes, including RICO; in such cases, courts have found this
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Molzof v. United States250 for the proposition that a statute‘s language
should be discerned in light of the common law principles Congress
intended to apply to the statute.251
Boim I similarly looked to the ATA‘s language in considering secondary
liability.252 The court focused on the definition of international terrorism
provided at § 2331(1) and the meaning of the word ―involve‖ in the context
of § 2333(a).253 Wultz concurred with Boim I‘s conclusion that this
definition, and the pointed reference to criminal law, meant that Congress
intended to make the ATA‘s civil provision ―at least as extensive as
criminal liability.‖254 Boim I and Wultz therefore concluded that where
criminal secondary liability would be available (through 18 U.S.C. § 2),
civil secondary liability must follow.255
Once the Wultz court determined that secondary liability existed under
the ATA, it applied the standard to evaluating civil aiding and abetting
liability established in Halberstam.256 In following the Halberstam
approach, which incorporated the Restatement, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that the defendant (1) was ―generally aware of his role as part of an overall
illegal or tortious activity at the time that‖ the assistance was provided and
(2) ―knowingly and substantially‖ assisted in the violation.257
In applying tort law principles to a secondary liability claim, the Wultz
court emphasized the importance of establishing a causal link between Bank
of China and the terrorist attack in question.258 The court noted that where
there was no allegation that a bank had direct ties to a terrorist group or had
the requisite knowledge that it was aiding a terrorist group, the ―mere
provision of routine banking services that benefited‖ the group in a
―general, nondescript manner‖ would not establish jurisdiction over the
bank.259 While this point directly addresses jurisdiction, it also suggests
that a simply negligent bank does not form a strong enough nexus between
a defendant bank and the terrorist act to warrant ATA liability.260 On the
other hand, the court would likely require that a bank manifest some degree
of knowledge.261 Such a connection is also necessary to establish that the
language to establish a proximate cause requirement when a plaintiff pleads primary
liability. See supra note 35.
250. 502 U.S. 301 (1992).
251. Id. at 305–07.
252. Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000, 1009 (7th Cir. 2002) (―We look to the language in order to
determine what Congress intended, and we also look to the statute‘s structure, subject matter,
context and history for this same purpose.‖).
253. Id. at 1009–10; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (1992).
254. Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 55 (quoting Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1020).
255. See Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1020; Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 55.
256. See supra Part I.B.1; see also Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 57.
257. Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 57 (quoting Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C.
Cir. 1983)); see also supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text (discussing Halberstam‘s
facts and the Supreme Court‘s description of the opinion as ―comprehensive‖).
258. See Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 34.
259. Id. (quoting In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 718 F. Supp. 2d 456,
488–90 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)).
260. Id.
261. Id.
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bank knowingly provided substantial assistance to those who carried out the
terrorist attack.262
The Wultz court contrasted the case against Bank of China263 with Licci
v. American Express Bank.264 In Licci, the court dismissed negligence
claims under the ATA civil provision on the basis that the defendant bank
had only provided routine banking services, including wire transfers, that
allegedly aided Hamas in executing a terrorist attack.265 The Licci court
found that it was not reasonably foreseeable that routine banking services
would result in rocket attacks in Israel.266 The Wultz court rejected Bank of
China‘s argument that its case was analogous to Licci, because the plaintiffs
alleged that Bank of China had provided banking services to PIJ with the
knowledge that the services would aid the group in carrying out terrorist
attacks.267 The court found that this allegation of knowledge suggested the
bank had conducted nonroutine services, therefore fulfilling the proximate
cause element.268
The Wultz court‘s analysis therefore permits ATA secondary liability and
suggests that, for a claim predicated upon such a theory to succeed against a
bank, the bank in question must manifest a more culpable mental state than
negligence.269
B. Courts Against Secondary Liability Under the ATA
This section examines courts that have come out on the other side,
holding that no such claim is possible under the ATA. This section begins
with the Seventh Circuit‘s holding in Boim III, in which the court rejected
Boim I‘s attempt to distinguish the ATA from Central Bank and instead
offered a ―chain of incorporations‖ theory that plaintiffs could potentially
use to hold banks liable under a primary liability theory—albeit one that
bears some resemblance to secondary liability. This section then shifts its
focus to the Second Circuit‘s recent ruling against secondary liability in
Rothstein v. UBS AG, where the court found no space for a secondary
liability cause of action and required a showing of proximate cause for
primary liability claims.

262. Id. at 66. The Wultz court found that whether such a connection existed was a
factual matter for trial, as the plaintiffs had adequately pleaded the connection in the
complaint. Id.
263. Id.
264. 704 F. Supp. 2d 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), vacated in part by Licci ex rel. Licci v.
Lebanese Canadian Bank, 732 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2013).
265. Id. at 410–11.
266. Id.
267. Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 66.
268. Id. (―The banking services allegedly provided by BOC to the PIJ are, therefore, by
no means the routine sort of services provided by the correspondent bank to the Lebanese
bank [in Licci].‖).
269. Id. at 57.
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1. The Seventh Circuit in Boim III
The defendants again appealed after the Boim I ruling, at which point the
Seventh Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded to the district court.270
Finally, the plaintiffs petitioned for a rehearing with the Seventh Circuit en
banc.271 The en banc court in Boim III then held that the ATA did not
provide a secondary liability cause of action, overruling the Seventh
Circuit‘s holding in Boim I.272 However, Boim III‘s approach to primary
liability has left the door open to liability for banks using a statutory chain
of incorporations by reference, an approach that has similar characteristics
to secondary liability.273
Courts have found that it is Central Bank‘s reasoning—not its subject
matter—that applies to ATA cases where a plaintiff seeks to use a
secondary liability theory.274 Judge Richard Posner, in his opinion for
Boim III, disagreed with the finding in Boim I that the instant case was
distinguishable from Central Bank.275 In his opinion, the Boim I court gave
too much weight to the fact that a private cause of action in section 10(b)
cases was implicit while the ATA‘s was explicit.276 Judge Posner
considered this comparison irrelevant because the Central Bank holding
extended to government suits as well as private suits.277 Judge Posner
noted that section 10(b) expressly authorized SEC suits.278 He therefore
concluded that, in the context of the ATA, ―statutory silence on the subject
of secondary liability means there is none.‖279
As support for this finding, Judge Posner cited congressional action taken
shortly after the Supreme Court‘s Central Bank ruling.280 The year
following the ruling, Congress enacted a law that permitted the SEC to
pursue those who aided and abetted securities fraud.281 Judge Posner
concluded that this legislation demonstrated that, even though the SEC
possessed an express cause of action, secondary liability was not
permissible until Congress expressly authorized such liability.282
270. Boim III, 549 F.3d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 2008).
271. See id.
272. See id. at 685.
273. See id. at 690.
274. See Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 474, 499 (E.D.N.Y 2012) (citing
Freeman v. DirectTV, Inc., 457 F.3d 1001, 1006 n.1 (9th Cir. 2006)).
275. See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 689.
276. See id.; see also Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000, 1019 (7th Cir. 2002).
277. See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 689 (citing Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank
of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 200 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. The provision states that
any person that knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance to another
person in violation of a provision of this chapter, or of any rule or regulation issued
under this chapter, shall be deemed to be in violation of such provision to the same
extent as the person to whom such assistance is provided.
15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2012).
282. Boim III, 549 F.3d 685, 689 (7th Cir. 2008).
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Furthermore, in 2008 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its Central Bank
holding and stated clearly that the decision also applied to SEC suits, not
merely private actions.283
In its dismissal of the secondary liability interpretation, Boim III offered
as an alternative the ―chain of incorporations‖ theory of primary liability
available under the material support provision.284 This court, as well as
many others, has concluded that the material support crime as pleaded
under § 2339B constitutes an act of ―international terrorism.‖285
Boim III‘s logic presupposes a seamless combination of the ATA civil
provision, the material support provisions, and the ATA‘s definition of
international terrorism under § 2331(1). The court argued that Congress
had intended courts to play these provisions off of one another.286
According to the court in Boim III, in using the material support crime in
conjunction with § 2333(a), plaintiffs would be combining the secondary
liability nature of the material support provision (which explicitly
incorporates criminal secondary liability) with a primary liability theory
under the ATA civil provision.287 According to Judge Posner ―primary
liability in the form of material support to terrorism has the character of
secondary liability.‖288 Thus, he argued, Congress had in fact expressly
imposed liability on a class of aiders and abettors via a statutory ―chain of
incorporations by reference.‖289
Under this theory, a plaintiff begins at § 2333(a), which provides that a
plaintiff must have been injured ―by reason of an act of international
terrorism.‖290 A plaintiff could then move to § 2339B, which prohibits
knowingly providing support to a terrorist organization or attempting or
conspiring to do so.291 Furthermore, because the Supreme Court in
Humanitarian Law Project held that the material support provision‘s
knowledge requirement only extended to knowledge that the material

283. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 156–59
(2008). Judge Posner also suggested that to permit a secondary liability private action under
the ATA would overextend federal courts‘ extraterritorial jurisdiction. Boim III, 549 F.3d at
689–90.
284. Boim III, 549 F.3d at 690.
285. See Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000, 1015 (7th Cir. 2002); Abecassis v. Wyatt, 704 F. Supp.
2d 623 (S.D. Tex. 2010); Goldberg v. UBS AG, 690 F. Supp. 2d 92, 114 (E.D.N.Y. 2010);
In re Chiquita Brand Int‘l, Inc. Alien Tort Statute & S‘holder Derivative Litig., 690 F. Supp.
2d 1296, 1309 (S.D. Fla. 2010); Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 268
(E.D.N.Y. 2007); Weiss v. Nat‘l Westminster Bank, PLC, 453 F. Supp. 2d 609, 613
(E.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, 392 F. Supp. 2d 539, 564–
65 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
286. Boim III, 549 F.3d at 690. Judge Posner‘s majority opinion asserted that ―[§§ 2333
and 2331(1)] are part of the same statutory scheme.‖ Id. (citing Perry, supra note 35, at
257)).
287. Id.
288. Id. at 691.
289. Id. at 692.
290. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2012).
291. Id. § 2339B.
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support would go to a designated terrorist organization, a defendant need
not know that its support was specifically going toward terrorist acts.292
Other courts have considered this possibility as a potential alternative to
permitting secondary liability under the ATA on the basis of the statute‘s
language and legislative history.293 For instance, in September 2014, the
Second Circuit in Weiss v. National Westminster Bank294 reversed the
Eastern District of New York‘s grant of summary judgment to National
Westminster Bank of Scotland (―Natwest‖), in a case where the material
support law served as the basis for primary liability under the ATA.295 The
plaintiffs had accused Natwest of providing material support to Hamas via
transferring funds and maintaining accounts on behalf of a group called
Interpal.296 The Second Circuit reversed and remanded to the lower court
on the basis that the court should have incorporated into § 2333(a) the
mental state required of material support criminal suits—in other words,
knowledge that the group was a terrorist organization, as established in
Humanitarian Law Project.297 While Interpal was located on OFAC‘s
SDGT list, neither the British government nor the European Union had
designated the group as a terrorist organization.298 As the SDGT only
applies to U.S. financial institutions and U.S. persons,299 it remains unclear
whether OFAC sanctions against a state sponsor of terrorism or the
presence of a group or individual on an OFAC list serves as constructive
notice for foreign banks providing services to such entities.300 Perhaps, as
the district court in Weiss suggested, such a question is ―better suited for the
political branches of government.‖301
2. The Second Circuit‘s Take on Secondary Liability
Until 2012, the Second Circuit served as fertile ground for secondary
liability suits against banks.302 Then, two decisions, one in the Second
Circuit and one in the Eastern District of New York, took apart secondary
liability but in different ways. In Rothstein, the Second Circuit overturned
years of case law and indicated a turning of the tide against secondary

292. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 16–18 (2012).
293. See, e.g., Weiss v. Nat‘l Westminster Bank, PLC, 936 F. Supp. 2d 100 (E.D.N.Y.
2013); Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 950 F. Supp. 2d 459, 460 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); Abecassis v.
Wyatt, 704 F. Supp. 2d 623, 645–47 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
294. 936 F. Supp. 2d 100, 118 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), vacated and remanded, 768 F.3d 202 (2d
Cir. 2014).
295. Weiss, 768 F.3d 202.
296. Id. at 204.
297. Id. at 207–08.
298. See Weiss, 936 F. Supp. 2d at 111.
299. See Exec. Order No. 13,224, 15 C.F.R. pt. 744.12 (2001).
300. Id.
301. Weiss, 936 F. Supp. 2d at 118; see supra Part III (considering the merits of this
―chain of incorporations‖ approach and whether it provides a realistic avenue for plaintiffs to
hold banks liable for the actions of their clients).
302. See, e.g., Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 950 F. Supp. 2d 459, 460 (E.D.N.Y. 2013);
Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 242 F.R.D. 199 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
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liability. In Gill v. Arab Bank,303 a court in the Eastern District found
Congress did not intend for secondary liability under the ATA.
a. Rothstein Raises the Bar
The plaintiffs in Rothstein were U.S. citizens who pleaded that they had
been injured, or their relatives had been injured, in terrorist attacks in Israel
spanning from July 30, 1997 to July 22, 2006.304 Hamas and Hezbollah
were responsible for the attacks, which consisted of five bombings and
multiple rocket launchings.305 The plaintiffs alleged that UBS AG , a Swiss
bank with U.S. offices, had facilitated U.S. currency transactions with
Iran,306 which, in turn, funded Hamas, Hezbollah, and PIJ with the intent to
aid in the commission of terrorist attacks.307 They brought a claim under
§ 2333(a) that the bank had aided and abetted international terrorism.308
In 2013, the Second Circuit upheld the decision of the district court to
dismiss plaintiffs‘ secondary liability claim against UBS, finding that such a
claim predicated upon § 2333(a) did not exist.309 Rothstein found that the
ATA‘s implementation of criminal provisions established a form of aiding
and abetting liability but did not expressly address Boim III‘s ―chain of
incorporations‖ approach.310 The court observed that, given Congress‘s
express provision for secondary liability in other areas of the law, the civil
provision‘s silence on the issue was likely intentional.311 The court noted
that Congress could take action to explicitly create a secondary liability
private cause of action under § 2333(a) in the future.312
The court also dismissed the plaintiffs‘ attempt to hold UBS liable under
a primary liability theory, finding that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated
303. 893 F. Supp. 2d 474 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
304. Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 2013).
305. Id. at 87.
306. The plaintiffs alleged that Iran pursued an official policy targeting Israelis and the
State of Israel. Id. at 85.
307. Id. at 86.
308. Id. at 88. The plaintiffs also initially alleged that UBS had aided and abetted
violations of customary international law; the district court dismissed this claim in its
entirety, holding that it was preempted by the ATA. See Rothstein v. UBS AG, 647 F. Supp.
2d 292, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
309. Rothstein, 708 F.3d at 97–98 (discussing the application of Central Bank to ATA
cases and agreeing with Boim III‘s holding that the ATA did not provide an aiding and
abetting cause of action).
310. Id. The court did note, however, that the chain of causation alleged by the plaintiffs
was too tenuous to provide for proximate cause, which the court identified as a pleading
requirement for ATA primary liability. See id. at 88; see also Brief of Petitioners-Appellants
at 3 n.1, In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 714 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2013) (No. 13-318).
Additionally, in a recent opinion upholding the jury‘s verdict in the Linde v. Arab Bank case,
a judge in the Eastern District of New York explicitly endorsed Boim III‘s ―chain of
incorporations‖ approach. Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 04-cv-2799 (BMC) (VVP), 2015
WL 1565479, at *27 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2015).
311. Rothstein, 708 F.3d at 98.
312. Id. (―It of course remains within the prerogative of Congress to create civil liability
on an aiding-and-abetting basis and to specify the elements, such as mens rea, of such a
cause of action.‖ (emphasis omitted)).
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the necessary proximate cause linking the bank with the terrorist attacks.313
The court supported this holding by analogizing the ATA‘s language to the
language in the RICO civil provision, which also incorporated the ―by
reason of‖ phrase.314 This finding contrasts with Boim III, which made no
mention of a proximate cause requirement.315
b. Gill v. Arab Bank
In Gill, a case out of the Eastern District of New York, the court
methodically dismantled the Wultz and Boim I approach to secondary
liability. The Gill court instead sided with Boim III, finding little difference
conceptually between ATA cases and Central Bank.316 The Gill court
viewed the issue as whether federal courts have the power to infer
secondary liability in a civil statute where Congress made no mention of
it.317
The court in Gill gave greater consideration to Wultz and Boim I‘s
emphasis on the ATA‘s legislative history than did the courts in Boim III or
Rothstein.318 The Gill court cautiously weighed the argument that Congress
intended the ATA private cause of action to include secondary liability and
ultimately dismissed this analysis.319 The court argued that Wultz‘s reliance
on legislative history was ―contrary to the realities of the legislative
process.‖320 The court claimed that Wultz wrongfully assumed that
Congress, in enacting the ATA, acted on a unified front on a point of law
that was not addressed in the statute‘s text itself.321
The court also scrutinized certain aspects of the congressional record.322
For instance, in his testimony, Joseph Morris indicated that he believed
secondary liability could be found when an entity was negligent.323
However, Gill noted that this understanding of the law was inconsistent
with the ATA‘s provision of treble damages, which are generally not
available in negligence cases.324 Gill also suggested that to apply § 2333(a)
to all aspects of civil litigation would be unreasonable—and argued that

313. Id. at 88–89.
314. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
315. See generally Boim III, 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008). In addition, Judge Diane
Wood in Boim III suggested that the majority‘s holding would permit plaintiffs to charge
banks without any demonstration of proximate cause. Id. at 724 (Wood, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
316. Gill v. Arab Bank, 893 F. Supp. 2d 474, 500 (E.D.N.Y 2012).
317. Id. at 497.
318. Id. at 501.
319. Id. at 500–01 (finding that it was ―irrelevant‖ that Central Bank‘s private right of
action was implied).
320. Id. at 501 (citing Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”:
Legislative Intent As Oxymoron, 12 INT‘L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992)).
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
324. Gill, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 501.
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even proponents of secondary liability have essentially recognized this fact,
as they have not attempted to pursue the tort theory of strict liability.325
Gill also challenged Boim I‘s assertion that Congress intended § 2333(a)
to be as extensive as criminal liability in terrorism cases.326 The court
argued that, instead, Congress‘s enactment of a general criminal secondary
liability statute shows that Congress knows how to provide for such liability
if it wants to.327 According to the court, the absence of such a statutory
provision demonstrated that Congress did not intend to create secondary
liability under the ATA.328
III. RESOLVING THE SECONDARY LIABILITY CONUNDRUM
The case law on secondary liability under the ATA has posed a number
of questions: Are these banks innocent institutions wrongfully swept up in
litigation over heinous crimes they did not commit? Or are banks part of
the larger problem of terrorism financing, and the most practical source of
relief for terrorism victims?
Unsurprisingly, the answers to these questions depend on the specific
facts of each case. While ATA cases involving banks vary, 329 organizing
them into three general categories allows for helpful analysis of the
secondary liability issue: (1) cases where the defendant bank engaged in
routine financial services and demonstrated negligence, at most; (2) cases
where the bank‘s activities extended beyond routine services to the point
where the bank could potentially be liable under a primary liability theory;
and (3) cases where the connection between the terrorist group and the bank
was likely too tenuous for primary liability, yet the bank intentionally and
extensively engaged with a state sponsor of terrorism or a party on OFAC‘s
SDGT list.330
Part III of this Note argues that the language of the ATA civil provision
does not extend to secondary liability, and therefore banks, under current
law, cannot be charged with aiding and abetting terrorist attacks. Part III.A
explains why legislative history does not rebut the presumption against
secondary liability that the Supreme Court established in Central Bank.331
Terrorism victims will therefore have no course of redress against the first
category of banking cases, as primary liability will not be an option without
the kinds of red flags that indicate the bank‘s knowledge that it is directly
aiding a terrorist entity. Part III.A also demonstrates why the ATA
currently does not provide for bank liability in the second or third category
of banking cases. The absence of a viable cause of action in these cases,
where the defendant bank‘s conduct goes far beyond routine financial
services, is arguably undesirable. Accordingly, Part III.B suggests that
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

Id.
See id. (citing Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000, 1019 (7th Cir. 2002)).
Id.
Id.
See supra Introduction.
See supra Introduction.
See supra Part I.B.2.a.
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Congress amend the ATA to expressly permit secondary liability suits.
This Note proposes that such an amendment should incorporate a mental
state threshold of extreme recklessness or intent, and that courts should
apply the Halberstam standard of requiring ―substantial assistance‖ to the
tortfeasor.332 While this concept is embedded within JASTA, that bill has
other features upon which this Note does not directly comment.333 This
Note refrains from completely endorsing JASTA and only speaks to the
secondary liability issue under the ATA.
A. The ATA Does Not Provide a Viable Avenue for Holding Banks Liable
for Acts of International Terrorism
Part III.A addresses why courts should not follow the Wultz court‘s
finding that the ATA civil provision permits secondary liability private
actions.
This section additionally explains the often-overlooked
implications of the ATA‘s definition of ―international terrorism‖ at
§ 2331(1).334 As this section demonstrates, this definition includes an
intent requirement that is at odds with a ―chain of incorporations‖ theory
based upon the ATA‘s material support provision. As a result, only
defendant banks that have committed acts that conform to the current
definition of ―international terrorism‖ should be held liable under the ATA.
1. The ATA‘s Legislative History Does Not Overcome the Central Bank
Presumption Against Secondary Liability
Wultz, in permitting secondary liability claims under the ATA, relied
heavily upon legislative history.335 In particular, Wultz relied on Senator
Grassley‘s statement that the purpose of the ATA was to supply terrorism
victims with all of the weapons available to civil plaintiffs under traditional
tort law theory.336 As a sponsor of the ATA, Grassley‘s statement should
bear some weight, and aiding and abetting liability is a traditional tort law
principle.337
However, the presumption against secondary liability that the Supreme
Court established in Central Bank is difficult to overcome.338 As the
Eastern District noted in Gill, the issue in Central Bank was whether federal
courts generally had the power to infer secondary liability when a statute
was silent on the topic.339 The Supreme Court in Central Bank offered no
indication that its ruling was only limited to securities fraud private suits.340
332. See supra Part I.B.1.
333. See supra notes 74–78.
334. See supra note 35.
335. See supra Part II.A.
336. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
337. Note, however, that while the Supreme Court has endorsed the Halberstam model,
there is not unanimity on the precise elements of tort law aiding and abetting liability. See
supra note 100 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 233–34.
339. See supra notes 316–18 and accompanying text.
340. See supra Part I.B.2.a.
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In fact, the Court held that there was generally no presumption in favor of
reading aiding and abetting into a statute that was silent on the issue of
secondary liability.341 Congress could have easily indicated in § 2333(a)
that secondary liability was available. Many courts, including the Second
Circuit in Rothstein, have reached this conclusion in recent years.342
The Boim III court rightly pointed out that the Supreme Court‘s ruling in
Central Bank applied not only to the implied private right of action under
section 10(b) but also to the expressly granted government right of
action.343 This fact significantly diminishes Boim I‘s argument that courts
should treat civil secondary liability in ATA and securities fraud cases
differently. In addition, the language of the ATA is very much in line with
the statutory language of the RICO civil provision, which states: ―Any
person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section
1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States
district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the
cost of the suit.‖344 If courts have generally applied Central Bank to civil
RICO, it makes sense to apply its reasoning to ATA aiding and abetting as
well.345
Furthermore, while there is evidence in the ATA‘s legislative history to
suggest that Congress intended plaintiffs to use the civil provision against
terrorism financers,346 legislative history can be unreliable and should not
override hard textual evidence.347 While the ATA‘s more general goals
might be clear from the legislative history,348 it is far more difficult to
identify a unified congressional purpose on the more specific issue of
secondary liability.349
The Gill court illuminated the kinds of
inconsistencies that can arise from an overzealous reliance on legislative
history.350 For instance, Joseph Morris‘s testimony in favor of holding
negligent defendants liable for aiding and abetting acts of terrorism is
starkly at odds with other evidence, including § 2333(a)‘s explicit treble
damages provision.351
341. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
342. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
343. See supra notes 274–79 and accompanying text.
344. See supra note 249 and accompanying text. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2012)
(providing plaintiffs with a private cause of action when injured ―by reason of‖ international
terrorism, with treble damages as a potential remedy), with 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (providing
plaintiffs with a private cause of action when injured ―by reason of‖ a § 1962 RICO
violation, with treble damages as a potential remedy).
345. See supra notes 147–48 and accompanying text.
346. See supra Part I.A.2.
347. See supra note 128 (explaining that the Court in Central Bank found that the lack of
textual evidence of secondary liability was enough to resolve the case in defendants‘ favor);
supra note 320 (discussing that the Gill court found that Wultz‘s strong reliance on
legislative history was ―contrary to the realities of the legislative process‖).
348. These goals include offering private plaintiffs a chance for justice and deterring
terrorism. See infra Part III.B.
349. See supra note 321 and accompanying text.
350. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
351. See supra notes 66, 71–72. As treble damages are punitive in nature, they do not
apply to negligence cases.
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Even evidence suggesting that banks were intended as an ATA target can
cut the other way—such discussions demonstrate that Congress was aware
that the ATA did not clearly permit a secondary liability cause of action.352
Thus, one can presume that confusion surrounding the secondary liability
issue was apparent to Senator Grassley.353 Congress had the chance to
explicitly provide for secondary liability in the ATA but chose not to do so.
Finally, Tel-Oren and Klinghoffer, two of the cases that spawned the ATA,
were not banking cases.354 In these instances, Congress wanted to give
plaintiffs an opportunity to obtain civil damages from the actual terrorist
organizations that funded and supported the attacks.355
The Wultz court asserted that Bank of China‘s alleged knowledge that it
was providing financial services to terrorists overcame the benefit of the
doubt often applied to routine services.356 However, this point alone is not
enough to rebut the ATA‘s language and permit secondary liability. The
routine or nonroutine nature of a bank‘s services to a terrorist group should
be considered only if the civil provision granted secondary liability in the
first place. For the reasons above, the ATA does not appear to provide for a
secondary liability cause of action.
2. Applying the Material Support Law to § 2333(a)
Creates Inconsistencies
As discussed in Part II.B, Judge Posner in Boim III proposed using a
―chain of incorporations‖ theory to hold liable organizations that provide
financial services to terrorist organizations.357 Plaintiffs have frequently
invoked this theory to attempt to hold banks primarily liable under the ATA
when a secondary liability theory has failed.358 If the court considers
§ 2339B to qualify as an act of international terrorism, it would then apply
the mental state standard established in Humanitarian Law Project; as a
result, a defendant would only be required to know that he or she was
dealing with a terrorist organization and would not be required to
specifically intend to aid terrorism.359
At first glance, this solution to the secondary liability issue appears quite
feasible, but upon further inspection, it raises certain problems. The trouble
concerns the clash between the Supreme Court‘s holding in Humanitarian
Law Project and the text of the current definition of international terrorism.
This Note argues that courts are often incorrect in applying the material
support law as a basis for primary liability under the ATA civil provision.
For the reasons below, the ―chain of incorporations‖ method is not a viable
alternative to ATA secondary liability for banks.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 52–63 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 52–63 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.B.1.
See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.1.
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The material support crime does not completely fit the definition of
international terrorism at § 2333(1).360 The crime could feasibly fulfill
§ 2331(1)(A); while funding terrorists is not a violent act in itself, courts
have found that financing terrorism is dangerous.361 The inconsistency
between the definition and Humanitarian Law Project arises at
§ 2331(1)(B). This subsection states that an act of international terrorism
must also ―appear to be intended‖ to intimidate or coerce civilians,
influence a government‘s policy by coercion or intimidation, or impact a
government‘s conduct through assassination, mass destruction, or
kidnapping.362
The implications of this failure of the ―chain of incorporations‖ approach
are significant. In cases such as Linde v. Arab Bank, where there is
persuasive evidence that the bank had extensive knowledge of its dealings
with a terrorist group, this knowledge would not be a sufficient basis for
primary liability—a plaintiff would need to demonstrate the defendant‘s
specific intent pursuant to § 2331(1)(B).363 While it is possible that a
plaintiff could meet this threshold of proof, this standard would frequently
prove insurmountable.364
B. Congress Should Pass Legislation Amending the ATA
Due to public policy interests in providing an effective civil remedy for
terrorism victims against banks that knowingly aid terrorists, Congress
should amend the ATA to provide for aiding and abetting liability for acts
of international terrorism. This bill could provide a workable solution to
the conflict arising from the ATA‘s vague current language.
Particularly in cases where the actual terrorists are beyond the reach of
the American judicial system, or where state sponsors of terrorism have
defaulted, victims of terrorism may have no source of relief without the
ability to pursue those who conducted business with these parties.365
Following the Tel-Oren and Klinghoffer cases, the American public became
keenly aware of terrorism victims‘ limited options for redress.366 The ATA
was enacted to fix this problem—it is therefore unlikely that Congress
would be satisfied with the law existing as an empty shell, without any real
power to bring plaintiffs relief.
Although Congress‘s intent cannot alter the text of the ATA in hindsight,
it can inform actions moving forward. The ATA‘s goals were to provide
360. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
361. See supra note 203. Judge Posner compares ―[g]iving money to Hamas‖ to ―giving
a loaded gun to a child.‖ Boim III, 549 F.3d 685, 690 (7th Cir. 2008).
362. 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(b) (2012). See supra note 35 and accompanying text for the
full statutory definition of international terrorism.
363. See supra Part I.C.1 for discussion of the Linde case.
364. Consider the cases discussed in Part II, where knowledge was often alleged but
demonstrating actual intent was difficult or impossible. See also supra Part I.C.1 and its
discussion of routine and nonroutine banking services and what such services indicate about
a bank‘s mental state.
365. See supra Part I.C.
366. See supra Part I.A.2.
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relief to plaintiffs and to deter terrorism.367 In cases where the bank was
merely negligent, it is unlikely that the threat of a lawsuit under an ATA
aiding and abetting liability theory will deter terrorism financing—in fact,
such a threat could potentially wreak havoc on financial systems as well as
diplomatic relations.368 On the other hand, in cases where a bank
persistently conducted business with nations included on the SST list, the
bank arguably had constructive notice and a stronger nexus exists between
the bank and the terrorist attack.369 Such a link should not automatically
result in bank liability; in applying secondary liability under the ATA,
courts should incorporate the Halberstam standard, based on the
Restatement, which requires knowledge and substantial assistance.370
In banking cases, a plaintiff therefore should be required to demonstrate
that the bank was extremely reckless in its handling of terrorist-linked
accounts. For example, continued engagement with businesses within a
state sponsor of terrorism, such as Iran, could establish such a mental state.
This careful application of aiding and abetting charges only will be
possible once Congress takes action to permit secondary liability under the
ATA. Congress could arrive at a similar result by altering the ATA‘s
definition of terrorism so that it better matches the material support law‘s
knowledge standard, which would render Boim III‘s ―chain of
incorporations‖ approach more feasible.371 However, as this definition
serves as the basis for other provisions aside from § 2333(a),372 its text is
probably best left unaltered. An amendment to the ATA to permit
secondary liability, applied as described above, would solve the
complicated issue of how and when to hold banks liable for acts of
international terrorism.
CONCLUSION
When the assets of a terrorist organization or its state sponsor are
unreachable, where should plaintiffs turn? Banks have emerged as an
attractive target. For many plaintiffs, suing a bank and pleading under a
civil aiding and abetting theory may represent the best chance for relief.
Nevertheless, this Note agrees with the Second and Seventh Circuits that
the ATA‘s text does not provide for secondary liability in civil suits.
To end the analysis here, however, would render an incomplete picture of
the current scope of liability under the ATA. Courts that do not permit
secondary liability have often misapplied the material support to terrorism
law as an alternative to aiding and abetting liability. Congress should
367. See supra Part I.A.2, I.C.
368. See generally Sant, supra note 14.
369. See supra Part I.C.2 (discussing OFAC and the State Department‘s process of listmaking).
370. See supra Part I.B.1.
371. See supra Part III.A.2 (identifying the problems with the ―chain of incorporations‖
approach).
372. This definition also mirrors the definition of international terrorism in other federal
statutes. See Harper, supra note 35, at 1138.
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amend the ATA to include secondary liability because the ATA, interpreted
correctly, does not provide a viable avenue for relief for private plaintiffs in
cases where banks demonstrate extreme recklessness without clear evidence
of intent. However, courts should only permit aiding and abetting claims
against banks where there is overwhelming evidence that the bank‘s
involvement went beyond providing routine financial services, either due to
its extensive interaction with a state sponsor of terrorism or some other red
flag. Through applying this strict standard, courts can maintain the delicate
balance between serving national security interests and protecting legitimate
financial institutions from unjust persecution.

